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ABSTRACT 
Alliance management in post-Cold War US-Israeli relations 
by  
CHAU Wun Liong  
Master of Philosophy 
 
 
There is always a controversial debate on why the US-Israeli relationship can enjoy 
lengthy endurance (even after the end of the Cold War). Scholars have traditionally 
offered explanations through either the strategic role of Israel to the US, or domestic 
factors including the Jewish lobbies in the US, or the cultural affinities between the 
two states. However, they tend to emphasize the significance of only one particular 
dimension, marginalizing possible insights from competitive dimensions.   
 
This research aims to offer a different approach to study US-Israeli relations through 
alliance management theories. Although there are no formal military treaties 
between the US and Israel, the relationship between the two states is indeed a de 
facto alliance. Therefore alliance management theories are applicable to the study on 
the US-Israel relations. A new explanation transcending the boundaries amongst 
various traditional approaches can be achieved. 
 
This research showed phased fluctuations within this bilateral alliance. Critical 
junctures, including (i) the end of the Cold war, (ii) the 9/11 incident, (iii) US 
turmoil in post-war Iraq, forced the US to redefine its top interests in the Middle 
East. The US-Israeli alliance will become more tension-prone when allying partners 
experience growing conflicting top interests or weakening shared top interests. 
Successful alliance management between the two states could stabilize the relations 
in case of high conflicting interests while consolidate the relations in case of low 
conflicting interests. The US-Israeli alliance has successfully limited the level of 
tensions and thus maintained a close and stable relationship even after the end of the 
Cold War.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction  
The US took over the hegemonic role in the Middle East from Great Britain 
soon after the end of the Second World War. In the Middle East, Israel was often the 
storm centre of regional disputes. The prolonged Arab-Israeli conflicts since the 
establishment of the state of Israel, especially the Israeli-Palestinian one, were one of 
the fundamental roots of regional violence. The US and Israel gradually built up 
strong linkages since the 1960s and even developed to a “de facto alliance” 
nowadays. Although the US had put forward the “peace process” since 1970s, it 
failed to make significant progress till now. The Arab states ascribed the failures to 
the American bias towards Israel. Indeed the prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, 
especially the perception of American bias towards Israel on all issues, were 
generally regarded as one of the major sources of anti-Americanism in the Middle 
East.
1
  
1.1  Research questions and objectives 
Despite encountering certain troubles, the US retained its cohesive 
relationship with Israel even after the end of Cold War and thus there is always a 
                                                 
1
 William B. Quandt, “New US Policies for a New Middle East?”, in The Middle East and the United 
States, ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2007), 500.  
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controversial debate: why can the US-Israeli relationship enjoy lengthy endurance? 
Scholars usually offer explanations by either the strategic role of Israel to the US, or 
domestic factors like the Jewish lobbies in the US, or the cultural affinities between 
the two states. However, they usually suffered fundamental limitations to overlook 
inspirations from competitive streams by viewing their suggested focus as the 
overriding factor to determine the US-Israeli relations.  
The key objective of this research is to offer a different approach to answer 
the above question through alliance management theories. Although there are no 
formal military treaties between the US and Israel, the relationship between the two 
states, as further discussed below, is indeed a de facto alliance. Therefore alliance 
management theories are applicable to the study on US-Israeli relations. A new 
explanation encompassing the boundaries amongst various traditional streams can be 
achieved. Besides, this thesis would try to offer explanations on two sub-questions. 
First, why could the much weaker Israel sometimes have strong bargaining positions 
versus the US in such an asymmetric alliance relationship? Second, as the 
establishment of the US-Israeli alliance relationship rooted from significant 
convergence of national interests, there should be fluctuations in alliance 
cohesiveness when the US and Israel redefined their national interests. Major 
3 
 
historical events could force either the US or Israel to reshape perceptions of its 
national interests. How did such strategic redefinitions affect intra-alliance 
management of US-Israeli relations?  
1.2  Literature review on US-Israeli relations 
In the US, there are growing debates on the strategic value of the US-Israeli 
alliance. Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer ignited the biggest storm in their 
book Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, claiming that Israel is no longer a 
strategic asset but rather a strategic liability to US after the end of Cold War. They 
ascribed the feeble gestures of US politicians over Israel to the restraint exercised by 
influential far-rightist Jewish lobbies in the US.
2
 It belongs to one of the three major 
traditional appraoches to study US-Israel relations. Local lobby groups are usually 
crucial factors in US domestic politics. Just as Michael Donelan argued, “US foreign 
policy [is] an emanation of domestic politics”3, so the domestic politics perspective is 
indeed unneglectable in the study of US-Israel alliance. Yet we should not forget that 
the role of lobbyists and interest groups is only one of the factors in this approach. 
They did not necessarily represent the definitive but swinging public opinion. 
                                                 
2
 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2007), 5-6.  
3
 Michael Donelan, “The Elements of United States Foreign Policy” in Foreign Policies of the 
Powers, ed. F.S. Northedge (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), 45.  
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Another example of this approach is Cheryl A. Rubenberg‟s Israel and the American 
National Interest: A Critical Examination which argued that even the pro-Israel 
Jewish lobbies like AIPAC might not represent the interests of the majority of Jews 
in the US, they had distorted the perception of US national interests for their own 
political agenda.
4
  
Another major approach followed traditional realist approach in theories of 
international relations. For realists, national strategic interests formed the key 
determinant of rational foreign policy-making. In this perspective, the US-Israel 
alliance should be put in a broader context of US Middle East and even global 
strategy. Israel had an important strategic role to the US and thus the alliance 
relationship should be maintained. Indeed the argument of Mearsheimer and Walt 
was also bounded in this framework. Their argument that Jewish lobbies have played 
a too influential role in US Middle East policy originated from their low appraisal of 
the post-Cold War strategic value of US-Israel alliance. On the other hand, there are 
certainly responses which maintained that strategic interests are still overriding in US 
foreign policy-making to Israel and in the Middle East. A.F.K. Organski‟s The $36 
                                                 
4
 Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Urbana 
and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 375.  
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billion bargain: strategy and politics in U.S. assistance to Israel
 
is representative 
literature on the national or strategic interest approach
5
.   
The last approach lay on the stream of social constructivism in theories of 
international relations, referring the formation and maintenance of the US-Israeli 
alliance to cultural affinities between the two countries. Cultural affinities included 
the similarities in political culture, historical and religious ties, as well as shared 
values and ideologies. Yet this dimension is seldom regarded as the dominant 
explanation for the lengthy endurance of the US-Israel alliance. Examples included 
Michelle Mart‟s Eye on Israel: how America came to view Israel as an ally6 and 
Elizabeth Stephens‟ US policy toward Israel: the role of political culture in defining 
the "special relationship”7.  
This thesis was not written for joining the debate on whether Jewish lobbies 
were distorting US Middle East policy. Instead, my research aims to avoid traditional 
approaches which rely on only one particular dimension to explain the US-Israel 
alliance. The three dimensions should be best considered as three ideal types, and the 
alliance management between US and Israel is indeed a mixture of effects of all three 
                                                 
5
 A.F.K. Organski, The $36 Billion Bargain: Strategy and Politics in U.S. Assistance to Israel (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1990).  
6
 Michelle Mart, Eye on Israel: How America Came to View Israel as an Ally (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2006).  
7
 Elizabeth Stephens, US policy toward Israel: the role of political culture in defining the "special 
relationship" (Portland OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006). 
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dimensions in fluctuating proportions. Although the realist national and security 
interests dimension may appear more significant in this thesis, the other dimensions 
may be more applicable particularly in some cases.  
1.3  The US and Israel: “alliance” or “special relationship”?  
There are confusing descriptions of the cooperative bilateral relationship 
between Israel and the United States. The notions of “special relationship”8 and 
“alliance”9 are most commonly adopted by scholars to describe US-Israeli relations. 
The two terms refer to the same concept in the context of US-Israel relations, and are 
often used interchangeably. For instance, Walt adopted “special relationship” in the 
book Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy which he co-wrote with Mearsheimer. Yet 
he also put the US-Israeli relationship as an example of alliance into his alliance 
theory classic The Origins of Alliances. However, he was referring to the same 
concept. Indeed, academics and diplomats have adopted a range of terms to portray 
                                                 
8
 Some examples for the notion of “special relationship” can be seen in: (1) John J. Mearsheimer and 
Stephen M. Walt, Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). 
(2) Elizabeth Stephens, US Policy toward Israel: the Role of Political Culture in Defining the “Special 
Relationship” (Portland OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006). (3) Michael Thomas, American Policy 
toward Israel: the Power and Limits of Beliefs (London; New York: Routledge, 2007). (4) Bernard 
Reich, “The United States and Israel: the Nature of a Special Relationship”, in The Middle East and 
the United States, ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 2007), 205-225. (5) Dumbrell, 
John and Atel R. Schäfer. ed. America’s “Special Relationships” (London; New York: Routledge, 
2009).   
9
 Some examples for the notion of “alliance” can be seen in: (1) Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of 
Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). (2) Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance 
Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008). (3) Herbert Druks, The 
Uncertain Alliance: The US and Israel from Kennedy to the Peace Process (Westport, Connecticut; 
London: Greenwood Press, 2001). (4) Michelle Mart, Eye on Israel: How America Came to View 
Israel as an Ally (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2006).   
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cooperative international relationships: “coalition”, “pact”, “bloc”, “entente”, 
“détente”, “alignment” as well as “special relationship” and “alliance”.10 This makes 
the definition of the relative concepts even more confusing. To avoid such confusions, 
I would only adopt “alliance” to describe US-Israel relations in my arguments.  
Arthur A. Stein has argued that “alliances mark the cooperative end of the 
continuum of I nternational relations”, with wars as the opposite conflictual end.11 
Alliance thus should rank highest to imply the extent of cooperation among those 
confusing terms. The term “special relationship” indeed cannot properly imply the 
strength or cohesiveness of a cooperative relationship.  
Another major reason that I prefer adopting the term “alliance” is the much 
richer existence of systematic theories for “alliances” than “special relationships”. 
Although there is a range of literatures which study US-Israel relations under the 
framework of “special relationship”, they seldom showed general theories which are 
applicable to other inter-state relationships. After all, the term “special relationship” 
                                                 
10
 Generalized from : (1) Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 151. (2) Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, John D. Sullivan. Unity and 
Disintegration in International Alliances (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985). 
11
 Arthur A. Stein, Why Nations Cooperate (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1990), 151.  
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is indeed an invention by Winston Churchill to describe wartime US-UK relations.
12
 
This is a term with political implications more than theoretical implications.  
In the literature on alliance theory, alliances are usually discussed together 
with alignments. Both refer to cooperative relationships amongst two or more states 
but “alliance” is always viewed as a stronger word than “alignment”. For instance, 
Glenn H. Snyder defined alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or 
non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their 
own membership”, while alignments as only “expectations of states about whether 
they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions”.13 Stephen 
M. Walt regarded alliance as “a formal commitment for security cooperation between 
two or more states, intended to augment each member’s power, security, and/or 
influence”, while alignment is distinguished by its informality.14 Ole R. Holsti, P. 
Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan argued that “an alliance is a formal 
agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues”.15 
Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane distinguished alliances and alignments 
through their difference on institutionalization: alliances as “exclusive security 
                                                 
12
 Elizabeth Stephens, US policy toward Israel: the Role of Political Culture in Defining the “Special 
Relationship” (Portland OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), 1.  
13
 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4, 6.  
14
 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World”, World Politics 61, no. 1 (Jan 2009), 86.  
15
 Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International 
Alliances (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1985), 4.  
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institutions oriented towards threat”, and alignments as “minimally institutionalized” 
ones.
16
   
From the above definitions, we may catch the important common grounds to 
describe the nature of alliances: (i) security (or military) cooperation and (ii) 
formality (or institutionalization) of cooperation. In this thesis, “security 
cooperation” would be viewed as a more appropriate term than “military 
cooperation”. Formality usually refers to the signing of treaties or agreement for 
mutual military commitment or cooperation. However, Israel has indeed never signed 
a mutual defence agreement with the US as in normal cases of alliances.
17
 This lack 
of formal documents may explain why some scholars adopted “special relationship” 
instead of “alliance” to describe US-Israel relations. Yet I believe the closeness of 
relations is more important than whether a treaty is really signed. The closeness of 
relations between the US and Israel is expressed through three facets: diplomatic 
protection, financial support and military cooperation. 
First, Israel has enjoyed strong diplomatic protection from the US in the 
international arena. The US had vetoed 39 United Nations Security Council 
                                                 
16
 Celeste A. Wallender and Robert O. Keohane, “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions” in Imperfect 
Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, ed. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and 
Celeste A. Wallender, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 28. 
17
 Carol Migdalovitz, “Israel: Background and Relations with the United States” (Order Code: 
RL33476), Congressional Research Service (April 2, 2009).  
10 
 
Resolutions which were unfavourable to Israel, among a total of 181 resolutions 
vetoed by all permanent members of UNSC between Jan 1946 and May 2006. This 
does not count those proposals withdrawn owing to foreseeable vetoes from the US. 
Israel could therefore unrestrictedly act against international expectations under such 
protection.
18
  
The second facet appeared in the status of Israel as the largest cumulative 
recipient of US foreign aid since World War II. This status was built upon Israel 
being the largest single annual aid recipient from the US in the period between 1976 
and 2004, and since just second to Iraq. The financial assistance consisted of both 
economic and military programs, including loans and grants, which amounted to 
around $102 billion until 2008 (in historical dollars, or over $176 billion in constant 
2008 dollars).
19
 However, the above figures from the reports of Congressional 
Research Services (CRS) might still be underestimated ones as there are uncounted 
money transfers to Israel. For instance, money from the Department of Defense 
(DOD, of the US) budget in the name of joint research or developmental projects 
were excluded from such accounting.
20
  
                                                 
18
 Michael Thomas, American policy toward Israel: The Power and Limits of Beliefs (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 5.  
19
 Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel” (Order Code: RL3322), Congressional Research 
Service (Dec 4, 2009).  
20
 Shirl McArthur, “A Conservative Tally of Total Direct U.S. Aid to Israel: $97.5 billion and 
11 
 
This brought us to the third, and also the most important, facet of military 
support and cooperation. Alliance theories generally take a strong military coalition 
as the pivotal definition for an alliance. Although the US and Israel have never 
signed any alliance treaties, Israel was named as a “major non-NATO ally” of the 
United States from April 1988.
21
 This conferred Israel with bidding preferences on 
US defence contracts and even cheap acquirement of surplus US equipment.
22
 This 
is indeed a common status also shared by even some other Middle East states, but 
Israel‟s affinities with the US clearly overrode other Middle East states as it also 
enjoyed an ultimate security promise: qualitative military edge (QME). The US has 
gifted Israel with the commitment to its QME over regional threats since the Johnson 
administration.
23
 Although the definition of QME appeared only after the US 
Congress legislation in 2008
24
, Israel has enjoyed substantial military support and 
cooperation much earlier than such clarification. For instance, the US and Israel have 
                                                                                                                                          
counting”, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (May 2003): 32-33, 59.  
21
 Bernard Reich, “The United States and Israel: the nature of a special relationship”, in The Middle 
East and the United States, ed. David W. Lesch (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2007), 212.  
22
 Michael Thomas, American Policy toward Israel: The Power and Limits of Beliefs (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 4-5. 
23
 William Wunderle and Andre Briere, “Augmenting Israel‟s Qualitative Military Edge”, Middle East 
Quarterly (Winter 2008), 49-58.  
24
 Jeremy M. Sharp, “U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel” (Order Code: RL33222), Congressional Research 
Services, (Dec 4, 2009).  
Note: And definition of QME can be seen in the “Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008” passed by 
US Congress (P.L. 110-429):  
the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from any individual 
state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage 
and casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, 
including weapons, command, control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics are superior in capability to 
those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors. 
12 
 
established a “Joint Politico-Military Group” since 1983. This bilateral strategic 
forum comprised a range of representatives from the diplomatic, military, 
intelligence and foreign affairs services.
25
 The two countries even have intelligence 
exchanges
26
 and missile defence cooperation
27
 with each other.   
As shown above, the depth of cooperation, especially in the military sector, 
between the US and Israel should have already met the standard of an alliance. 
Despite the lack of formal treaties or agreements, the ties between the US and Israel 
are stronger than many other inter-state relationships that fulfil theoretical definitions 
of alliances. Indeed, formal treaties or agreements are usually a mutual commitment 
to and institutionalization of existing security cooperative intentions or acts. The key 
for an alliance relationship is not a paper treaty but substantive security cooperation. 
If we must set formality as a requirement of alliance definitions, I would rather adopt 
Walt‟s description of “de facto alliance”28 in reasoning the US-Israel relations. The 
intrinsic alliance nature of US-Israel relations allows the application of alliance 
theories in my research.  
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1.4  Structure of thesis  
This thesis consists of seven chapters. In this chapter, I have first briefly 
reviewed literatures on the US-Israeli relationship and then have noticed the 
deficiency of the reliance of only one of the three major traditional approaches. 
Therefore this research seeks to offer a different approach to study the US-Israeli 
relationship through alliance management theories, as this bilateral relationship is 
indeed a de facto alliance.  
In Chapter 2, I will review literatures on existing alliance management 
theories from which my research framework would be derived and crystallized. The 
theory on alliance management by Glenn H. Snyder and the theory on post-crisis 
diplomacy by Yakub Halabi would set the basis of my research framework. I will 
also outline and explain the chronological structure to divide the post-Cold War 
timeline into three phases (Phase I, II and III) according to three major crises: (i) the 
end of the Cold War, (ii) the 9/11 incident, and (iii) the US turmoil in Iraq. In Chapter 
3, I will explain my choices of major crises in this research and examine the impact 
of those three major crises on the US top regional interests in the Middle East and 
Israeli top national interests.  
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From Chapter 4 to Chapter 6, I will study US-Israeli alliance management in 
Phase I to III, with one chapter for one phase. In each of the three chapters, there will 
be two parts, with the first part comparing US and Israel top interests in that phase 
and the second part analyzing the corresponding internal dynamics of alliance 
management. In Chapter 7, the last one, I would conclude and generalize my findings 
from the previous chapters and therefore I could portray the general fluctuations of 
the US-Israeli alliance relationship since the end of Cold War and show how 
successful alliance management contributed to maintain the strong relationship 
between the US and Israel.   
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Chapter 2 Literature Review, Research Framework and Methodology 
2.1  Literature review 
This research aims to offer a different approach to study the US-Israeli 
relations through the perspective of alliance management. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
traditional studies on the US-Israeli relations tend to emphasize the significance of 
only one particular dimension, marginalizing possible insights from competitive 
dimensions. Even though some may accept arguments from other dimensions, most 
of them would still view their own dimension as overriding with the others only 
offered supplement in maximum. Yet through the perspective of alliance 
management, the insights from all dimensions could be absorbed under this research 
framework and thus an unbiased stance towards different dimensions could be 
achieved. In a sense, the three traditional dimensions could be viewed as ideal types 
of the rationales of alliance decisions. In this research, the strategic interest 
dimension was most frequently applied. Yet this did not mean the other dimensions 
were secondary or supplementary to the strategic interest dimension. The other 
dimensions could bring greater insights in some cases.   
16 
 
2.1.1  Alliance theories 
There are a range of general theories on alliances but the US-Israeli alliance is 
seldom studied with applications of those theories. A recent example of such 
applications is Jeremy Pressman‟s Warring friends: alliance restraint in international 
politics. This book studied alliance restraints in the US relations with both Israel and 
Great Britain. In the case of the US-Israeli alliance, Pressman analysed seven cases 
of Israeli military policy conflicting with US expectations, with three of them 
showing unsuccessful US attempts to restrain Israel. He argued that restraining 
attempts failed because the US has not really mobilized its power resources. 
However, if the stronger side determined to restrain its ally and mobilize its power 
resources, the weaker side would have to concede reluctantly. The US would not 
decide to make restraining efforts unless Israeli actions might challenge its regional 
policies.
29
  
Pressman‟s theory of alliance restraint provided a special perspective on the 
studies of alliance management. Traditional alliance theories, like those in Stephen M. 
Walt‟s classic The Origins of Alliances, focused on the study of alliance formation 
and how states manoeuvred such alliance to maximize their national and security 
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interests through balancing or bandwagoning.
30
 Walt argued: “the primary purpose 
of most alliances is to combine the members‟ capabilities in a way that furthers their 
respective interests.”31 Pressman indeed has added restraining allies as a possible 
secondary purpose, if not also the primary reason in some cases, of alliance 
formation.  
Patricia A. Weitsman explored on the basis of Walt‟s concept of dichotomy of 
“balancing” and “bandwagoning” in Dangerous Alliance: Proponents of Peace, 
Weapons of War. She proposed a curvilinear relationship between perceived threat 
and the tendency of allying with threat origins. When a state perceived different 
extents of threat, it would adopt different strategies toward the threat origins. 
Vis-à-vis the threat from an adversary, a state may choose to hedge (to), tether (with), 
balance (against) and bandwagoning (with).
32
 Weitsman further supplemented her 
theory by discussing alliance cohesion and outlining a range of possible dyadic 
alliance combinations, which is determined by the different motives (i.e. hedge, 
tether, balance, or bandwagon) of the allying states.
33
 The US-Israeli alliance 
perhaps best suited her definition of low internal threat (i.e. mutual threats between 
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the two allies) and high external threat, which theoretically resulted in high cohesion 
and balancing alliances.  
However, as mentioned before, the US-Israeli alliance is indeed an 
asymmetrical one. The perception of the level of external threats should be quite 
different between US and Israel owing to the difference in both national power and 
the proximity with potential enemies in the Middle East. Such differences may also 
influence the management of US-Israel alliance. Furthermore, we have to notice that 
Weitsman‟s account of possible dyadic alliance motivations is very much simplified. 
In reality, bilateral relationships usually involved more than one motivation. When 
Stephen Walt analysed alliance strategies in unipolarity, he expanded his famous 
balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy to a range of six responses built upon one‟s 
support or opposition to the unipole. However, even Walt would regard those six 
responses extended from balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy as ideal types. As he 
stated, states may select one strategy on one issue but choose another strategy on 
another issue in reality.
34
  
Indeed Walt has also made his own analyzing framework of alliance 
management. In his article “Why alliances endure or collapse”, he generalized three 
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main factors of alliance collapse and five key factors of alliance persistence. (i) 
Changing perceptions of threat, (ii) declining credibility and (iii) domestic politics 
can contribute to alliance collapse. For the factor of domestic politics, there are 
further divisions to (a) demographic and social trends, (b) domestic competition, and 
(c) regime change. For alliance persistence, either (i) hegemonic leadership within 
the alliance, (ii) preserving credibility, (iii) domestic politics and elite manipulation, 
(iv) the level of institutionalization or (v) ideological solidarity and shared identities 
would be the key factors.
35
 However, Walt‟s framework cannot explain why there 
are still occasional disputes within the US-Israeli relations. It may be systemic 
enough to explain why US-Israeli alliance will not break but it is not detailed enough 
to portray the internal dynamics within the alliance.  
Glenn H. Snyder, in his book Alliance Politics, should provide one of the 
most thorough neo-realist accounts for alliance management till now. He viewed 
alliance management as an intra-alliance bargaining process, with one‟s relative 
bargaining power determining the bargaining results. He then figured out different 
factors and situations which involved such bargaining process. Weitsman has 
accurately pointed out that Snyder focused on interactions and negotiations but not 
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the factors determining policies towards external threats of an alliance.
36
 However, 
this deficiency is rather minor as interactions and negotiations are inevitable in 
alliances and we need to understand their dynamics in order to understand how the 
US and Israel maintained their alliance relationship since the end of Cold War. This 
can be remedied by merging Yakub Halabi‟s theory, which will be discussed next. In 
this research, Snyder‟s alliance management theory would be a key reference in the 
theoretical framework.  
2.1.2 Halabi’s post-crises diplomacy theory 
Although alliance theories, especially Snyder‟s alliance management theory, 
will be borrowed in this research, there is addition of elements to enrich the 
theoretical applicability of the framework to explain the fluctuations of US-Israeli 
relations. This thesis is highly inspired by Yakub Halabi‟s book US foreign policy in 
the Middle East: from crises to change, which studies the fluctuations of US regional 
strategy in the Middle East. Halabi generalizes six central arguments in the book: 
First, a major crisis demonstrates obsolescence of an existing order and let the 
hegemon know how regional powers became disenchanted with this order. Second, 
only hegemon is able to create a new regional order and regional powers can only 
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inflict costs on the hegemon and impair an existing order in maximum. Third, the 
hegemon adopts new mindsets for strategic rejuvenation in order to take it as a new 
hegemonic controlling mechanism and retain regional allies locked in a refreshed 
post-crisis order favourable to the hegemon without stimulation of allies‟ fear to 
hegemony. Regional powers can sometimes take advantage on the hegemon in a 
particular issue area to show their opposition to the existing order. Fourth, the 
hegemon, the local regimes, and the local people are the three parties to a regional 
order. The regional order would be fully hegemonic in the Gramscian sense only 
when it satisfies every party. Fifth, the hegemon, aiming to stabilize the new order, 
locks local regimes by creating new international or regional institution while 
encourages regional states to lock local people by creating new domestic institution. 
Sixth, the hegemon may be forced to pursue discrepant policies when there are too 
many states in the region and contradictory interests for the hegemon.
37
  
Indeed Halabi‟s arguments can be further concentrated to one key argument: a 
major crisis will highlight deficiencies in an old set of ideas which are 
institutionalized in existing policies, and this will stimulate the emergence of a new 
mindset which can ultimately help policymakers of the hegemon reshape foreign 
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policy or construct new institutions. Yet the crisis must be a “major” one. It should 
bring a huge public impact on US economy, society, and polity so that it could mark 
a “watershed in the America comprehension of the politics”.38 In other words, US 
strategic perceptions of the Middle East will be redefined from time to time, once a 
major crisis occurred.  
The resultant change in US strategy would probably also influence the 
bilateral relationship between the US and other Middle East states. Yet the US-Israeli 
alliance seemed well maintained since it was informally established. This would raise 
an interesting question: How did the US-Israeli alliance adapt to the unexpected 
situations and the subsequent US strategy redefinition? A possible answer would be 
the good adaption of the US-Israeli alliance to the new situations. Such an adaptation 
can refer to the alliance management of both states, including the rejuvenation of 
strategic common grounds in both countries.  
Through absorbing Halabi‟s theory, a chronological structure can be set up 
upon basic alliance management theory. This can repair the most apparent deficiency 
of Snyder‟s alliance management theory, as Patricia Weitsman has accurately pointed 
out, i.e. the emphasis on interactions and negotiations with the neglect of the factors 
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determining policies towards external threats of an alliance.
39
 Halabi defined 
“policy” as the outcomes of the institutionalization of policymakers‟ mindsets which 
aim to achieve certain goals. Yet a new order emerges if a critical juncture breaks the 
credibility of the original mindsets.
40
 In other words, a major crisis serves as a 
triggering factor to redefine US regional strategy and makes the US-Israeli alliance 
adapt to the new regional situation.  
However, the term “major crises” will be replaced by “critical junctures”. 
The word “crisis” itself has a strongly negative meaning. However, the biggest 
deficiency of Halabi‟s arguments was its omission of the end of the Cold War as one 
of the events which brought dramatic impact to US foreign policy to the Middle East. 
The end of the Cold War triggered the reshaping of US global diplomatic priorities 
and thus US national security interests in the Middle East were redefined inevitably. 
According to Charles F. Hermann, a “crisis” should be defined as a situation which 
simultaneously induced “high threat” (i.e. threat to “the high-priority goals of the 
decision-making unit”) on, allowed “short time” (to respond) for, and brought 
“surprise” to the decision-makers of foreign policy.41 The end of the Cold War, 
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though having triggered redefinitions of US Middle East policy, could not be 
regarded as a threat to the US. As major non-crises like the end of the Cold War 
could also brought impact of similar nature,  the term “major crises” might not be 
the most accurate term to conceptualize situations which could trigger redefinition of 
US national security interests in the Middle East. Positive events like the end of the 
Cold War could also stimulate US strategic redefinition. So a neutral word of 
“critical juncture” would be better than a negative “(major) crisis”. Besides, short 
responding time was also not a critical element to reach the impact of similar nature 
to Halabi‟s “crisis”. For instance, the US turmoil in post-war Iraq, to be further 
elaborated next chapter, was also a critical issue to the US Middle East policy. 
However, its impact was chronic as it have gradually reverted the public support of 
launching war on Saddam‟s Iraq. Domestic pressure on the existing US 
administration accumulated and was finally expressed as the Republican fiasco in 
mid-term election and the resignation of hawkish Ronald Rumsfeld.  
Hermann‟s “crisis” showed logical similarities with Halabi‟s “crisis” at the 
element of “surprise”. While Halabi argued that major “crisis” will highlight 
deficiencies in an old set of ideas which are institutionalized in existing policies, 
Hermann defined “surprise” as “the absence of awareness on the part of 
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policymakers that the situation is likely to occur”.42 In other words, policymakers 
would be “surprised” by an unexpected situation. Therefore, in this thesis, a “critical 
juncture” to US Middle East strategy referred to the situation which US 
policymakers would not expect or would be surprised under the original strategic 
perception related to the Middle East. This would therefore force US policymakers to 
redefine its regional interests to adapt to the new situation.  
 
2.2  Theoretical framework for the research 
2.2.1  Framework Structure  
The theoretical framework in this research, as inspired by Halabi, first divides 
the post-Cold War timeline into phases according to the three major crises: (i) the end 
of the Cold War, (ii) the 9/11 incident, (iii) the US turmoil in post-war Iraq. Each 
critical juncture would trigger a definitive strategic re-evaluation of US Middle East 
policies and thus caused the start of a new phase. In other words, each phase was the 
time interval between two consecutive major crises. For instance, Phase I started 
from the end of the Cold War and ended after the 9/11 incident. The impact of each 
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critical juncture to the US top regional interests in the Middle East and Israeli top 
national interests will be analysed in Chapter 3. This relies on historical analysis on 
the perception change of decision-makers in both the US and Israel.  
In Chapter 4, 5 and 6, there are analyses on alliance dynamics within the 
US-Israeli relations of Phase I, II and III respectively. Analysis of each phase 
comprises two parts. Part A will compare the redefined US top regional interests in 
the Middle East and Israeli top national interests in order to examine the extent of 
interest convergence between the US and Israel. Part B will study the internal 
dynamics of alliance management between the US and Israel in order to examine 
how the US-Israeli relations adapt to the new situations induced by a critical juncture. 
This part relies on alliance management theories. As discussed above, Snyder‟s 
alliance management theory on intra-alliance bargaining process will serve as the 
theoretical core in this research, though insights from other literatures of alliance 
theories may also be incorporated into my research framework to remedy possible 
minor deficiencies. Rejuvenation of strategic common grounds will be needed for 
allying partners after a critical juncture which forces a state to redefine its interests. 
This reflects the goal of alliance management defined by Snyder, i.e. “(by either joint 
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or unilateral action…) to maximize joint benefits and minimize costs to one‟s 
independent interests”.43  
Finally, in Chapter 7, the general trends and alliance management dynamics 
of the US-Israeli relations in the three phases will be compared in order to examine 
the fluctuations of the US-Israeli alliance. More importantly, this comparison can 
offer us an explanation of why the US and Israel can maintain its alliance 
relationship after the end of the Cold War.  
2.2.2 Theoretical basis for analyzing internal dynamics of US-Israeli alliance  
  management (Part B of phase analysis)  
The theoretical basis for analyzing internal dynamics of US-Israeli alliance 
management relies heavily on Snyder‟s alliance management with incorporations of 
concepts mainly from Halabi‟s post-crisis diplomacy theory. Snyder‟s theory bases 
on his unique model of the international system. He views alliance management as 
an intra-alliance bargaining process on interest-conflicting issues, the results of 
which are determined by the relative bargaining powers of the allying partners. Allies 
may fall into security dilemma between abandonment and entrapment in the 
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bargaining process. The concepts and theoretical contents of Snyder‟s theory, and the 
amendments adopted in this research will be discussed in the following paragraphs.     
2.2.2.1  Model of the international system  
Snyder classified four interrelated analytic entities not only for alliance 
analysis but also for international system studies: “units” (states), “structure”, 
“relationships”, and “interactions”. While relationships and interactions are aspects 
of the systemic process, the acting unit (through its attributes) and system structure 
serve as “internal” and “external” inputs into the process respectively.44  
First, “unit” itself was not a meaningful analytic entity if its attributes were 
not taken into account. Those attributes would differentiate those units from others. 
Snyder did not have detailed accounts on the analytic entity of “unit”. Yet some 
examples of unit attributes can still be generalized: power resources
45
 (or forces), 
interests (or preferences)
46
 and level of vulnerability
47
.  
Second, traditional realist concepts of anarchy and polarity are two major 
aspects of system “structure”. However, Snyder argued that structure would not 
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directly determine a state‟s policy choice, but just served as systemic constraints on 
policy choices. Its linkage with “unit” mainly reflected the meaning of polarity 
(structure) as the distribution of power resources (unit attribute) in international 
system.
48
  
Third, “relationship” involved several principal components: alignments and 
alliances, common and conflicting interests, capabilities, and independence. Snyder 
argued that those items were not “structure” as “they are not systemwide concepts”. 
They are “characteristics of relationship between particular states” which are the real 
decisive determinants of choices and outcomes. Yet alliances are relationships which 
are influenced by structure. Snyder also distinguished the nature of interaction as 
behaviour from that of relationships as situational context of behaviour, while 
interaction and relationships often mutually influenced. In addition, he linked 
“relationships” and “units” together by arguing “relationships form at the intersection 
of the attributes of states”. For instance, when interests of two states (unit attributes) 
intersected, commonality or conflicts of interests (relationships) may rise.
49
  
Lastly, “interaction”, as defined by Snyder, referred to “any behaviour that 
impinges on or is influenced by some other party”. It served as the key dependent 
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variable in Snyder‟s theoretical account for alliance management. Snyder concluded 
three main “arenas” of an interaction “game”: military preparedness, military actions, 
and diplomacy. The former two related to military concepts are easy to reason. Yet 
we need a clearer definition of diplomacy. Snyder argued that diplomacy referred to 
“all verbal communication between states, including (i) alliance formation and 
intra-alliance bargaining, as well as (ii) communication and bargaining between 
adversaries”.50  
The concept of critical juncture can be freely incorporated into this 
framework. For instance, critical juncture would greatly alter mainly “units” (e.g. 
establishment of new ones or disappearance of old ones) and their attributes (e.g. 
interest perceptions of states). This continuously affects relationships (e.g. level of 
interest commonality or conflicts), and sometimes even “structure” (e.g. polarity 
change owing to reallocation of power resources after the end of Cold War). The 
remaining “interactions” are those efforts of adaptations to the new situations. We 
should not forget those changes in units and their attributes, and the subsequent 
changes in either structures or relationships, could also be the political outcome of 
those interactions. Indeed, those critical junctures could be in nature a kind of 
political outcome resulted from those interactions.  
                                                 
50
 Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 33-34. 
31 
 
In the US-Israeli alliance, US top regional interests in the Middle East and 
Israeli top national security interests served as the key “unit attributes”. The US had 
other interests in other region which were not applicable to the Middle East. Only US 
regional interests in the Middle East mattered because Israeli existential threats were 
basically limited to regional neighbours. As the analytic entity “relationship” referred 
to the intersection of unit attributes, the comparisons between the above US and 
Israeli interests served as the key “relationships” in this research. The converging 
interests brought the two states together to form the alliance. Yet the diverging 
interests did not necessarily distance the allying partners. Only conflicting interests 
might weaken an alliance. Those diverging interests that were not conflicting were 
usually insignificant to the alliance management.   
2.2.2.2  Intra-alliance bargaining process 
This research adopts Snyder‟s definition of alliance management as a process 
of tacit or explicit bargaining on both common and competitive interests. He argued 
that alliances always build on common interests but competitive interests also exist 
to different extents. The common interests induce states to form alliance, but the 
competitive interests exert oppositional forces to pull the allies apart. Therefore 
alliance management serves to “counter these centrifugal tendencies, by either joint 
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or unilateral action” so as to “maximize joint benefits and minimize costs to one‟s 
independent interests”.51  
This intra-alliance bargaining process is represented through the analytic 
entity “interactions” according to Snyder‟s theory. Therefore, the typologies of the 
two concepts are basically the same: military preparedness, military actions, and 
diplomacy. Military preparedness is intrinsically a matter of burden-sharing. Military 
actions are related to war-time manoeuvre. Snyder put much efforts of classifying 
subtypes of diplomacy: (i) “renegotiation of alliance terms”, (ii) “addition of 
member”, (iii) “bargaining about the diplomatic stance to be taken toward an 
adversary”, and (iv) “bargaining about conflicts between the allies not involving an 
adversary”.52 As the US and Israel had never fought on a war together as an ally, 
diplomacy was the dominant form of their interactions.  
Relative bargaining power and its determinants 
Snyder argued that the outcomes of the intra-alliance bargaining process will 
be decided by the relative bargaining power of allying states. Snyder further 
classified the major determinants of intra-alliance bargaining power: (i) degree of 
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dependence, (ii) firmness of commitment, and (iii) comparative intensity of own 
interests in the bargaining issues. When one‟s dependence to an ally grows, one will 
get more vulnerable to an ally‟s possible deprivation and thus lose bargaining power. 
When one is more firmly committed to an ally, the credibility of its threats of 
deprivation and thus its bargaining power will be impaired. When one values higher 
to its concession and lower to its ally‟s reciprocation in a bargaining issue, one will 
tend more to resist an ally‟s proposal and thus in a sense gain extra relative 
bargaining power against one‟s allies.53 However, an advantage in either one or two 
categories could be offset by a disadvantage in the other one or two categories, and 
the amount of power resources that a state owned would not directly change to 
advantages in those categories.
54
 A short reminder to the major determinants of such 
power is generalized in the figure below. The impact of those critical junctures will 
be explained through those concepts in this research.  
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Figure 2.1: Brief note on bargaining power and its determinants. 
Determinants 
The effect of its rise to one’s 
bargaining power 
Degree of DEPENDENCE to an ally Decrease 
Firmness of COMMITMENT to an ally Decrease 
Comparative intensity of own INTERESTS  
(in a bargaining issue) 
Increase 
“Dependence” of a state on an alliance, according to Snyder, referred to the 
“function of net benefit receiving from an alliance, compared to the benefits 
available from alternative sources”. In others words, dependence served as “the 
opportunity cost of terminating” any relationship, including alliances. However, 
Snyder argued the definition of alliance dependence should be limited to the essential 
military security value. Other values including prestige and domestic stability are 
only inessential luxuries.
55
 Yet doubts remain about Snyder‟s theory. As would be 
shown in the following chapters, the threats of restraining economic assistance were 
sometimes used as a restraining effort of the US to Israel. Moreover, under the 
pressure and calculations on future elections, is it really possible for a government of 
democratic regimes like the US and Israel to withstand domestic economic instability? 
Economic security could not be regarded as an inessential value. One possible reason 
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why Snyder omitted economic security is that economic linkages did not necessarily 
exist in military alliances. Yet economic security might have to be taken into account 
if there are strong economic links between allying states.  
Snyder defined “commitment” as “an arrangement of values that disposes one 
to act in a certain way”. It is a degree concept but an absolute either-or one. The two 
main sources of commitment are (i) “the verbal promises in the alliance contract and 
subsequent elaborations of it” and (ii) “interests in aiding the ally that would exist 
apart from the promise”. The strength of a verbal promise is determined by its 
explicitness and preciseness. A more explicit and precise promise would increase 
costs of non-fulfilment and reduced the credibility of a threat of non-fulfilment. 
Bargaining power of that state thus decreased by its strong commitment. 
Commitment-by-interest meant “a state‟s underlying interest in defending the partner, 
apart from the verbal alliance pledge”. If one state has strategic interests to protect its 
ally, its ally will earn extra bargaining power in front of it.
56
   
The “interests” described by Snyder as determinants of alliance management 
referred to “the parties‟ interest(s) in the specific issue about which they are 
bargaining”. It existed when conflicts of interest appeared, yet allying states could 
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still persuade their partner(s) to concede. This concept was different from 
“dependency” as it took the value of bargainer‟s concession and (/or) the value of its 
partner‟s offset into account. Increase in the former value or decrease in the latter 
value would lead a state to higher tendency to resist partner‟s bargaining proposal. In 
other words, the relative bargaining power in this category was decided by the 
comparative valuation of states‟ interests in conflict.57 
Snyder added some supplementary factors on the relative alliance bargaining 
power: time preferences and attitudes towards risk. The former one could be 
understood as the impatience of a state over a bargaining issue may impair its 
bargaining power (with the possibilities of high interests in it). The latter one meant 
that risk aversion could reduce a state‟s willingness to risk alliance breakdown and 
thus its bargaining power.
58
  
Alliance security dilemma  
A final important concept from Snyder‟s framework is the alliance security 
dilemma. This is built on the tension over an issue between the fear of abandonment 
and the fear of entrapment. The fear of abandonment comprises both the subjective 
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probability, as well as the costs to oneself, of partner‟s defection. Entrapment can be 
defined as the reluctant entrance into a war over unshared interests of the ally owing 
to one‟s commitment. It is more likely to occur when a state faces a strategic interest 
in defending its partner, rather than satisfies legal-moral commitment. In other words, 
alliance security dilemma involves the management of security-autonomy trade-off, 
with abandonment causing loss of security while entrapment causing loss of 
autonomy. This assumes that an optimum mix of security and autonomy for alliance 
members existed before the issue. Yet such optimum can be disrupted by “changes in 
the alliance‟s environment, or in the interests, capabilities, or domestic situations of 
the members themselves”.59 The alliance security dilemma is built upon the conflict 
of interests on an issue among allying states. If interest commonality is relatively 
high, both fear of abandonment and entrapment will be little. If allies face threats 
from different opponents, or face the same adversary but have different conflicts with 
that adversary, the alliance security dilemma will be very high.
60
  
The major forms of abandonment and entrapment suggested by Snyder are 
generalized below. Consecutive occurrence of the latter two forms of abandonment 
would devalue the alliance relationship for the partner.
61
 In the chronological range 
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of the research, only the last two forms of abandonment are likely to appear in the 
US-Israeli alliance.  
Figure 2.2: Forms of abandonment and Entrapment
62
  
 Abandonment Entrapment 
Forms 
1. Formal abrogation of the 
alliance 
1. Ally‟s outright and 
unexpected attack on the 
opponent 
2. Failure to fulfill alliance 
commitments  
2. Ally‟s direct provocation on 
opponent to attack 
3. Failure to meet the expected 
level of diplomatic support 
to the allying partner in a 
dispute with its adversary  
3. Ally‟s firm-held position in 
crisis bargaining which 
results in the outbreak of war 
There are either standard or alternative response to both the fear of 
abandonment and the fear of entrapment. Adopting the alternative response may lead 
to a better result but it often involves other risks. The standard response to the fear of 
abandonment is “to move closer to the ally in some way so as to increase its 
perception of one‟s loyalty”. Probability of abandonment decrease as the increase of 
ally‟s expected benefit from the alliance reduces its defection incentive. The three 
ways to achieve it are (i) “renegotiation of alliance contract in the ally‟s favour”, (ii) 
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“increase one‟s commitment by diplomatic communications and public statements”, 
and (iii) “support the ally in specific conflicts with adversary”. Yet there is an 
alternative response, i.e. “threaten to defect oneself unless the ally becomes more 
supportive”. The ally fearing being abandoned will probably tighten its alliance 
commitment or increase support to partner. Yet one has to risk being defected before 
it really practises its threats. If the threats to the ally exceed certain threshold, or the 
ally already considers defection, one‟s threat to defect will probably have negative 
impact.
63
  
The fear of entrapment provides impetus for one to restrain its ally. So the 
standard response to such fear is to move away from the ally through loosening one‟s 
commitment or threatening support withdrawal. This aims to force ally to concede so 
as to avoid fighting or be less bound to join the fight. There is also an alternative 
response, i.e. give the ally a firm commitment. This suits the case that “the ally is 
deemed unrestrainable”. This aims to deter the ally‟s adversary and/or make the ally 
more confident and relaxed when facing adversary. Yet risks exist as the tightened 
commitment can further entrap one when a fight really breaks out.
64
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2.3  Methodology 
This research adopts qualitative research methodology. This research relies on 
content analysis of academic literatures, news articles, governmental documents, 
reports from the Congressional Research Services. However, the insufficiency of 
open governmental documents about the US-Israeli relations as well as the time and 
cost restraints on interviewing relevant government officials will be clear stumbling 
blocks to this research.  
Method of multiple case studies will be adopted in the analysis of internal 
dynamics of US-Israeli alliance management. Yet it will be too complicated to study 
every case happened in the US-Israeli alliance. Therefore only cases related to (i) 
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks and (ii) major Israeli military actions in the Middle 
East will be selected.  
The significance of Israeli-Palestinian peace talks to the US and Israel, and 
even the Middle East, explains why the issue is selected. To the Middle East, the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, as discussed in Chapter 1, are one of the fundamental 
roots of regional violence in the Middle East. Regional stability can never be 
achieved if the Israelis and Palestinians cannot settle down their conflicts. To Israel, 
41 
 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks involve nearly all of its top national interests. To 
the US, its stances to those conflicts and to the peace process are the key sources of 
anti-Americanism in the Middle East, which may in turn harm its interests of 
regional stability. Furthermore, the character of continuity of the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace talks, allows comparison on different time phases, in the peace talks.  
Cases of major Israeli military actions are also selected because they can 
disrupt regional stability and often undermine the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. 
Besides, the US-Israeli de facto alliance is fundamentally a security relationship, 
therefore it is reasonable to take the US stance towards major Israeli military actions 
as a determinant of the cohesiveness of US-Israeli relations. Those cases of major 
military actions often shared similar kinds of consequences and thus are comparable 
in different phases.  
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Chapter 3  Critical junctures and their impact on US and Israeli top 
interests 
The greatest deficiency of Halabi‟s phase division is the omission of the 
impact of the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War marked a watershed in 
world politics and inevitably also US strategic perceptions in the Middle East. 
During the Cold War, the major US interests in the Middle East can be simplified as 
a “holy trinity”: Israel, oil and anti-communism.65 However, Halabi has correctly 
differentiated the subtle changes in the factor of oil. Before the oil crisis (1973-1974), 
oil prices have never been taken into real account. Yet this critical juncture forced US 
administrations to concern a reasonable oil price and the recycling of petrodollar into 
US market.
66
 This evolved oil access requirement lasting till now.  
3.1  Impact of critical junctures to US top regional interests in the Middle East 
3.1.1  Critical juncture I: The end of the Cold War  
As reflected in the 1995 National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement, US government was “especially pursuing a comprehensive 
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breakthrough to Middle East peace, assuring the security of Israel and our (Note: US) 
Arab friends, and maintaining the free flow of oil at reasonable prices” in the Middle 
East.
67
 The latter two are parts of the old “holy trinity” during the Cold War. Yet the 
remaining element, anti-communism has ceased to be a major US interest in the 
region since the end of the Cold War. Anti-communism was expressed as the efforts 
to block Soviet penetration in cold-war Middle East. When the Soviet Union became 
formally dissolved in December 1991, the US was formally relieved from the worry 
of Soviet penetration in the region. Yet before that, the US has already successfully 
punished Iraq for its invasion to Kuwait (August 1990 - February 1991) without any 
resistance from the Soviet Union. This indicated that regional regimes can no longer 
expect the Soviet Union as an alternative to US for support.
68
 In other words, the 
most direct impact of the Soviet collapse is the polarity change in the world system, 
changing from bipolarity in the Cold War to a new situation of unipolarity, with the 
US as the only superpower.  
There are two new major US interests emerged from the general pursuit for 
Middle East peace since the end of the Cold War: (i) nuclear non-proliferation and (ii) 
regional stability. In the 1993 Report on the Bottom-up Review, there were four main 
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global dangers to US rising instead of the previous general Soviet and communist 
threat: the potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass 
destruction, large-scale aggression from regional challengers or small-scale and often 
internal conflicts caused by “ethnic or religious animosities, state-sponsored 
terrorism, or subversion of friendly governments”, difficulties in promoting reform 
and democracy “in the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere”, and 
lastly, a general economic risk against US economic growth.
69
 Yet promotion of 
democracy, as reflected in the report, was not an overriding post-Cold War US 
regional goal in the Middle East. US efforts were concentrated on the former Soviet 
region and Eastern Europe. Besides, the major economic risk which was likely to be 
triggered in the Middle East was oil supply. The demand of oil access stability was 
already a major US national interest in the region. Therefore the only new major US 
interests are nuclear non-proliferation and regional stability.  
The pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation was a global issue which US 
inevitably also took it seriously. The disintegration of the Soviet Union brought a 
high risk of nuclear proliferation because: (i) there are no longer centralized 
command and control over nuclear systems in the former Soviet region, (ii) Russia 
and Ukraine, the major successors of former Soviet nuclear ability, might be tempted 
                                                 
69
 The White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Feb 1995):. 
45 
 
to sell their nuclear weapons due to financial difficulties, (iii) the former Soviet 
nuclear scientists and engineers could be hired by states which tried to develop 
nuclear weapons.
70
 Both Iran and Iraq showed signs of developing nuclear 
technology and perhaps even nuclear weaponry. Although it seemed hypocritical for 
the US to tacitly allow its Israeli ally to develop nuclear weapons, nuclear 
non-proliferation among Middle East states (except Israel which is promised to enjoy 
QME) was still a major US strategic interest.  
By controlling regional conflicts and challengers, regional order and stability 
which are favourable to the US can be achieved. The Gulf War against Hussein‟s 
invasion to Kuwait first implicated US determination to maintain regional order and 
stability.
71
 Barry Rubin argued that there were three major US regional goals during 
the Cold War. The first one was to marginalize the Soviet Union while strengthening 
US impact to the region. Second, the US had to advocate allies but stifle regional 
challengers. Lastly, peace preservation and war deterrence were also crucial to the 
US, yet those potential conflicts were regionally endemic and the US ability to 
resolve them was limited.
72
 Yet during the Cold War, regional challengers to the US 
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could choose to join the Soviet bloc. This could explain why the US would not 
tolerate a pro-Soviet Mosaddeq administration in Iran. In the post-Cold War era, 
there was no alternative backer for those regional challengers. US stifling efforts on 
them could solely serve for regional stability. Moreover, the US efforts to preserve 
peace were also restrained by the anti-communist factor during the Cold War. For 
example, the US could only put forward Israeli-Egyptian peace process after Anwar 
Sadat converted out from the Soviet camp. In contrast, the Reagan administration did 
not put substantial pressure on Israel to facilitate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
A key reason was the PLO was pro-Soviet. In other words, during the Cold War, 
regional stability was important but would be sacrificed in case of the need of 
anti-Communism. The US definitely wanted a stable Middle East, yet following its 
game rule. This pursuit for regional stability would no longer be overridden by 
anti-Communism since the end of the Cold War and thus rose as a major US interest 
in the Middle East. A key pillar was the “dual containment” between Iraq and Iran to 
ensure regional stability and indirectly protected oil-rich states in the Middle East.
73
 
Therefore we can see a more active US role in pushing forward the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process as will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
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3.1.2  Critical juncture II: The 9/11 incident  
Unlike the national security report in the Clinton administration, the Bush 
administration has no specific discussion on US interests in any particular geographic 
region in its national security report. Yet we can understand the change of core US 
regional interests through examining the key strategies outlined in the 2002 National 
Security Strategy of the United States of America:  
(i) champion aspirations for human dignity,  
(ii) strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent 
attacks against US and its friends,  
(iii) work with others to defuse regional conflicts,  
(iv) prevent our enemies from threatening US, its allies, and its friends 
with weapons of mass destruction,  
(v) ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and 
free trade,  
(vi) expand the circle of development by opening societies and building 
the infrastructure of democracy,  
(vii) develop agenda for cooperative action with the other main centres of 
global power, and  
(viii) transform US national security institutions to meet the challenges and 
opportunities of the 21
st
 century.
74
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Yet only (ii), (iii) and (iv) are directly related to US national security interests 
and (iv) is a succession of nuclear non-proliferation since the end of the Cold War. 
Just the same as pre-9/11 period, oil served as the core US interest in economic 
security and thus (v) was mainly expressed as stable oil access in reasonable price in 
the context of US Middle East core interest. The pursuit for democracy and human 
rights, i.e. (i) and (vi), often pushed the Bush government into dilemma. Yet they 
were usually sacrificed for short-term needs. For instance, there were accusations of 
mistreating jailed terrorists in the Guantánamo Bay detention camp and the US 
government refused to recognize the Hamas rule in Gaza through democratic election. 
The values of human rights and democracy were sacrificed for anti-terrorism and 
even Israel in the latter case. Perhaps at this stage, promotion of human rights and 
democracy was still not a major US interest, at least secondary to the top interests 
such as Israel and anti-terrorism. Furthermore, there are no other global powers to 
cooperate in the Middle East and the reformation of security institution is internal 
affairs and has no particular impact to the Middle East, so (vii) and (viii) are also 
invalid.  
It is worth of further analysing the above (ii) and (iii). Anti-terrorism became 
a top US security interest since the 9/11 incident. This terrorist attack launched by al 
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Qaeda
75
 should be regarded as one of the most dramatic historical turning point to 
US perception on its national and security interests. Although Stephen M. Walt 
argued that the then Bush administration had not radically converted its foreign 
policy priorities from its predecessors in many areas, he could not refute that US had 
absolutely no intention to fight “an all-out campaign against „global terrorism” 
before 9/11.
76
 Indeed even during the Cold War period, there were already strategic 
designs against terrorism.
77
 Yet anti-terrorism had never been a key pillar of US 
national security interests before 9/11. Besides, anti-terrorism was not an exclusive 
interests to the US. The US government also feared that terrorist could acquire 
nuclear weapons and other WMDs, as well as their precursors.
78
 
Regional stability, though still an important strategic goal, was no longer a 
top US priority to pursue, even the second Bush administration claimed to “work 
with others to defuse regional conflicts” and push forward the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process
79
. When the Bush administration decided to overthrow Saddam 
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Hussein, it has indeed forgone the previous policy of “dual containment” between 
Iraq and Iran. To achieve a stable Middle East, the pre-9/11 US governments 
preferred strengthen the containment by “smart sanctions”, i.e. selective embargo 
only on military items, to pre-emptive military actions towards any regional 
challenger.
80
 As Halabi argued, the Iraq War was not “a direct US response” to 9/11. 
The incident helped dissolve any possible resistance from president and congress to 
the neo-Conservative agenda to wage a war on Iraq.
81
 In other words, US goals on 
regional stability was overridden by the fear of being attacked in homeland owing to 
the 9/11 incident. Therefore pre-emptive (e.g. Iraq War) or retaliatory (e.g. 
Afghanistan War) military actions could get concurrency in the US government. Iraq 
was picked because it inflicted a range of US top strategic interests in the region: oil, 
anti-terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation. George W. Bush even claimed that Iraq 
was “the central front in the War on Terror”.82 The Second Bush administration also 
believed that it could practise the strategic goal (perhaps indeed secondary) of 
democratization in a Hussein-ousted Iraq. Regional stability should not be 
completely refuted as an important US Middle East strategic interest, but it had to be 
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sacrificed after 9/11 if there was a top strategic interest to fulfil. The corresponding 
part in the later 2006 version of the same report might explain, “Some conflicts pose 
such a grave threat to our broader interests and values that conflict intervention may 
be needed to restore peace and stability.”83 Just as shown in a self-reflection of 
George W. Bush, offense “on every battlefront”, but not regional stability, should be 
the key strategy in the War on Terror.
84
 In other words, the Bush administration 
indeed expected to sacrifice short-term regional cold-peace stability for long-term 
regional conflict-free stability under US hegemony. Yet the reality did not go along 
with its imagination.  
3.1.3  Critical juncture III: Turmoil in the Second Iraq War  
The Second Iraq War itself was not a turning point to US foreign policy. The 
military action followed the post-9/11 rationale to descend the priority of regional 
stability. Despite the easy victory against the Hussein regime, the coalition troop, 
with US army in majority, suffered growing casualties yet still in vain to restore 
domestic stability in Iraq. During the casualties‟ peak between 2004 and 2007, there 
were more than 800 US soldiers killed in Iraq annually.
85
 The war was also a grave 
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financial burden to the US government. The military operations in Iraq through DOD 
had totally cost US$ 706.7 billion until FY2010, with FY2007 and FY2008 the peak 
of budget spent.
86
 For post-war reconstruction and stabilization, Iraq even surpassed 
Israel to receive the most annual financial assistance from the US since 2004.
87
 The 
US public became more and more negative to US military operations in Iraq with 
growing sacrifice of lives and money.  
According to the Pew Research Centre poll research (See Figure 3.1), the 
people believing the decision to fight the Iraq War was right showed a general 
descending trend while those believing wrong a general ascending trend. At the 
beginning of the war, the right-wrong difference was about 75%-25%, but the 
proportion kept alternatively reversing since early 2005 and those believing Iraq War 
was a wrong decision completely surpassed those viewing as a right one from late 
2006. On November 2008, during the presidential election, the right-wrong 
proportion for the Iraq War was 39%-50% while that for Afghanistan War was still 
64%-25%.
88
 Eventually Democrat Barack Obama defeated President Bush‟s 
Republican compatriot, John McCain in the 2008 presidential campaign. However, 
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the electoral victory of Obama itself was not the watershed of US foreign policy. The 
accumulative disapproval in US public owing to the turmoil in Iraq, despite a gradual 
progress, was the actual catalyst to US strategic redefinitions.  
54 
 
 Figure 3.1:  
 
Source: Pew Research Centre
89
   
Other than domestic rebound, the geopolitical situations caused by the Iraq 
turmoil also stimulated the US government to redefine its strategic interests in the 
Middle East. In a special study of Foreign Policy, Iran, Moqtada al-Sadr and al 
Qaeda rose as the three biggest real winners in the Iraq War. Iran, as the ultimately 
biggest winner, successfully engaged in the political vacuum in post-war Iraq, 
especially through the Shiite majority in the state. Although Iran was posing 
enhancing threats to regional stability, the US government could not confront it with 
                                                 
89
 Jodie T. Allen, “Polling Wars: Hawks vs. Doves”, Pew Research Centre (Nov 23, 2009). 
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1420/american-opinions-of-war-iraq--iran-afghanistan-vietnam-somalia 
(accessed Apr 2, 2011) 
55 
 
military operations. Even containment to Iran faces the stumbling block of the 
anti-Americanism in the region.
90
 Sadr, the second biggest winner in this ranking, is 
a radical Shiite cleric which exploited the post-War turmoil to win influence in the 
Iraq.
91
 Although his influence was still limited to domestic arena, his actions in Iraq 
might bring indirect impact to regional stability. It could probably be the reverse of 
the expectations of the Bush administration that al Qaeda turned out to be one of the 
major real winners in the Iraq War. Al Qaeda could rally its forces again as the US 
government has diverted its attention to Iraq and relieved its pressure on al Qaeda. 
Besides, the Iraq War not only stimulated further anti-Americanism within global 
Muslims but also inspired a new generation of future Jihadists.
92
  
The Iraq War, resulting in domestic turmoil, brought both local and 
international sequels to the US governments. While 9/11 is a typical “turning point” 
to US perception of Middle East policy, the after-effect of the Iraq War did not 
appear at once. For instance, it took a gradual process to change domestic 
perceptions. In a sense, the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld, the hawkish Secretary 
of Defense, on late 2006 set a trademark of the surrender of post-9/11 US foreign 
policy rationale to the eventual domestic rebound owing to the troubles faced by the 
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US, especially the growing US casualties, in Iraq. Yet it is already more than three 
years after the US invasion.  
Regional stability resumed as a top US strategic interest owing to the crisis of 
Iraq turmoil. The fall of Saddam Hussein and the failed stabilization to Iraq 
destroyed the power balance in the Middle East. In this new phase, regional stability 
would not be sacrificed for anti-terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation, though the 
latter two were still among the top priorities. Therefore Iran, a regional challenger 
with both linkages with terrorist groups and nuclear development, was not set as US 
target for another military operation. Indeed, no US administrations dared to expand 
the warfront under such domestic atmosphere. Perhaps the Bush administration was 
reluctant to concede, but it had to re-stabilize the whole Middle East situation, not 
only Iraq. This could explain its new efforts to restore Israeli-Palestinian peace talks 
in its last two years. It would be discussed in details in Chapter 6.  
The division of phases reflected mainly how US strategic interests were 
redefined, without taking Israel into real account. This indeed followed Halabi‟s 
logic that only the hegemon (i.e. US) can self-create a new regional order, while 
regional powers (like Israel) can merely make the hegemon pay some costs to 
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undermine the existing order in maximum.
93
 By expanding this logic, we may 
assume that the US-Israel alliance would probably remain steady unless the US 
should face major redefinitions of its strategic interests. Whether Israel has similar 
redefinitions is minor to its alliance relationship with US. Such assumption may 
attract some suspicions, especially from those who emphasized the impact of Israel 
and its Jewish lobbies in the US. The accuracy of this assumption in reality would be 
further discussed in the following chapters. Yet at least a simple standard for 
re-structuring the historical timeline can be derived. Such simplification would not 
apply to the next part of alliance management, which requires detailed analysis of 
intra-alliance dynamics.  
3.2  The relatively consistent national strategic interests of Israel 
Moshe Dayan, Israeli former defence minister and foreign minister, has once 
said, “Israel has no foreign policy, only a defense policy.”94 Unlike the US as an 
external player in the region, Israel could face direct and immediate military threats 
from its Middle East neighbours owing to the geographical proximity. Therefore 
security and existence are the most important national interests to Israel. Steven R. 
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David has generalized three major sources of existential threats to Israel, (i) 
demographic threats of the Palestinians to the Jewish majority in Israel, (ii) military 
threats from conventional weapons on inter-state level, (iii) military threats from 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), e.g. nuclear weapons.
95
  
The demographic threat stems from the concern that the Arab population has 
faster growth than the Jewish population within Israel and Palestine region. The 
difference in population growth could challenge Israel‟s status as a Jewish state 
during democratic elections in long term.
96
 This can somewhat explain why Israeli 
administration always attempted to block the return of Palestinian refugees and thus 
brought barriers to the peace talks with the Palestinians.  
Owing to population deficit, Israel often suffered quantitative military 
disadvantage towards potential major regional enemies such as Egypt, Iran and Syria. 
Therefore Israel is determined to maintain its qualitative military edge over potential 
regional enemies through the US support. Conflicts within the alliance may arise 
when the US plans to sell weapons with high technology, which are potential to 
erode Israel‟s QME, to Middle East states. Yet Israel is more afraid of the threats 
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from WMD, especially nuclear weapons. Israel‟s QME would be destroyed if there 
are any states in the Middle East acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel also has nuclear 
weapons but deliberately shows ambiguity to this fact, i.e. neither admitting nor 
denying its possession of nuclear weapons.
97
 This is indeed a major deterrent and the 
last resort against its potential enemies. It will be a major existential threat to Israel 
when this ultimate QME is removed. Therefore Israel may carry out unilateral 
military operation against any regional powers if they attempt to acquire nuclear 
weapons.
98
 
Israel also has non-existential security concerns over regional terrorist groups. 
Regional terrorist groups brought another important security threat, perhaps not 
existential but more consistent, to Israel. As Zeev Maoz argued, Israel took 
low-intensity warfare with Arab states and sub-state actors as a key security strategy 
since its establishment. In addition to deterring and compelling opponents, Israel‟s 
limited military operations aimed to expand Israeli militarism, raise IDF morale, and 
even test for potential larger operations.
99
 Perhaps such argument may overlook the 
active attacking role of terrorist groups in the region. Yet it hints the strong vigilance 
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of Israel towards its neighbours. Maoz believed that Israel‟s strategy could have an 
ultimate deterrent effect on the Arab states but not on the Palestinians and 
Hezbollah.
100
 This partly explained why threats from states and threats from 
non-state actors (e.g. PLO, Hamas and Hezbollah) should be divided as two different 
types of threats in this research. If the conventional weaponry of the Arab states was 
strong enough, Israel could be overwhelmed. Yet conventional military threats from 
terrorist group probably could be consistent torment to the Israelis but could never 
really harm Israel‟s existence by itself.  
Moreover, Israel has strategic interests in territory. Territory is always a key 
issue in Arab-Israeli peace talks. The territories occupied from the several 
Arab-Israeli wars, the status of East Jerusalem, and the settlements beyond the 
“green line” raised the greatest controversies and are often causes of the breakdown 
of peace process. Indeed the resources on the territory are also an important issue in 
the peace talks. Water, as a scarce but vital resource in the Middle East, is especially 
highly strategic to both Israel and the Arab states.
101
 The Zionists even had unilateral 
plans on the Jordan River before Israel‟s establishment.102  
                                                 
100
 Zeev Moaz, “Evaluating Israel‟s Security of Low-intensity Warfare, 1949-2006”, Security Studies 
16, Iss.3 (2007): 347. 
101
 John Bulloch and Adel Darwish, Water Wars: Coming Conflicts in the Middle East (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1993), 15, 18.  
102
 Munther J. Haddadin, “Water in the Middle East Peace Process”, The Geographical Journal 168, 
61 
 
There is no fundamental change in the nature of strategic interests and 
perceived threats of Israel since the end of Cold War. Yet different administrations 
may have different perceptions to the extent of those strategic interests. For instance, 
while the Rabin administration would like to make certain concession on territory to 
the Palestinians, the Netanyahu administration did not believe in the proposal of 
“land for peace”. However, the nature of the perceived national security interests is 
consistent. Even Rabin‟s proposal of potential land concession is limited to region 
with low strategic values.  
The states involved may change yet the strategic interests and perceived 
threats of Israel are general. For example, there is no difference in the nature of 
nuclear threats of Iran and Iraq if either of them acquires destructive nuclear 
technology. Furthermore, the above national interests can be interlinked. For instance, 
the Palestinian issue is indeed a mixture of demographic threats, terrorist threats, 
territorial interests and resources interests. A unilateral military action may serve to 
both counteract terrorist threats and fulfil territorial and resources interests.  
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Chapter 4  Alliance management in Phase I: from the end of the Cold  
War 
In the coming three chapters, the alliance management will be analysed phase 
by phase. Critical junctures would bring changes to the content of the systemic 
analytic entities. The end of the Cold War was signalled by the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. However the end started when the Soviet Union could no longer 
maintain its global influence, even though it was too difficult to be exact about that 
moment. The most obvious change by this critical juncture appeared in the 
“structure” of the international system, which changed from bipolarity to unipolarity. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the US perception of national interests in the Middle East 
altered after the end of the Cold War. This belonged to the change in the “unit 
attribute”. The intersection level of interest perceptions between the US and Israel 
would thus fluctuate. Therefore the impact of the end of the Cold War also existed 
for the US-Israeli alliance “relationship”. The core of this research examined how the 
critical junctures redefined the “relationship” and “interactions” within the US-Israeli 
alliance. The linkage between “relationship” and “interactions” is not unidirectional 
but two-way. For instance, disputes between allying partners (interactions) owing to 
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convergence of interest perceptions (relationship) may be remedied by adaptation 
efforts (interactions) and thus the alliance (relationship) can be maintained.  
4.1  Comparison on US and Israeli top interests 
As discussed in Chapter 2, there had been a major redefinition of regional 
interests in the Middle East by the US administrations since the end of the Cold War. 
As drawn up in the following two tables, the Cold War pillar of anti-communism was 
downgraded and surpassed by WMD non-proliferation and regional stability. Yet 
reliable oil access and Israel‟s security remained as US top regional interests. On the 
Israeli side, the natures of its top national interests kept constant even after the end of 
Cold War. After all, the Soviet Union had never posed direct threats to Israel‟s 
overriding interest of survival. Yet as Israel‟s regional enemies had often relied on the 
Soviet support, the Soviet collapse greatly relieved the possible pressure from the 
Soviet-backed states and PLO to Israel. There might also be different perceptions of 
the urgency to fulfil or protect their top interests. For example, the Rabin and the 
Netanyahu administrations portrayed very different attitudes towards the peace talks 
with the Palestinians. The natures of their perceived interests were basically the same 
but they might carry out their national interests in different ways.  
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In post-Cold War period, the top interests of the US and Israel in the Middle 
East became less convergent. First, the unimportance of anti-communism inevitably 
impaired the strategic value of Israel to the US. There were even arguments that 
Israel could have already become a “strategic liability” to the US since the end of the 
Cold War.
103
 Second, Israel‟s territorial expansion and resources maximization could 
be constrained by the US prior pursuit of regional stability. Territorial and resources 
distributions were long the core in the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. To ensure a 
stable Middle East, the US governments knew that they had to help in resolving the 
conflicts between the Israelis and the Palestinians. This offered the US governments 
an incentive to push forward a new stage of the peace process after the end of the 
Cold War. In other words, the increasing US interests to resolve Israeli-Palestinian 
conflicts would strengthen US bargaining power in the issue.  
Both the US and Israel had convergent interests in preventing the Middle East 
states obtaining WMDs during the Cold War. Yet the intensity of this interest varied 
owing to the proximity differences. The US governments just upgraded and altered 
the nature of this interest according to the new situation since the Soviet collapse. 
They now viewed the issue in a global context with the fear of the proliferation of the 
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former Soviet nuclear weaponry and technology to “rogue states”, including those in 
the Middle East, while Israeli concern remained consistent. However, the nuclear 
factor was basically irrelevant to the examining issues in this research for two 
reasons. First, no Middle East state other than Israel was believed to have 
successfully developed nuclear weaponry. Second, Israel faced no emergency 
sufficiently serious to force it to use its hidden nuclear military power even till Phase 
III. It was not necessary for the case of nuclear proliferation to be brought into the 
issues of either Israeli-Palestinian peace talks or Israeli unilateral military actions.  
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Figure 4.1: [Cold War] US top regional interests in the Middle East and Israeli top 
national interests  
US Israel 
Anti-communism  Jewish majority in controlled territories 
Reliable oil access  Inter-state conventional weaponry attack prevention 
Israel‟s security  WMD attack prevention 
 Anti-terrorism 
 Territories and resources maximization 
 
Figure 4.2: [Post-Cold War] US top regional interests in the Middle East and 
Israeli top national interests  
US Israel 
Reliable oil access Jewish majority in controlled territories 
Israel‟s security Inter-state conventional weaponry attack prevention 
WMD non-proliferation  WMD attack prevention 
Regional Stability Anti-terrorism 
 Territories and resources maximization 
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4.2  Internal dynamics of US-Israeli alliance management  
When the Soviet Union was already on the verge of collapse, the US 
successfully consolidated its hegemony in the Middle East. The global interest of 
anti-Communism gradually faded out from late 1980s and regional stability 
correspondingly climbed up to be a US top interest in the Middle East. Besides, there 
was also a side-effect of the Soviet disintegration on Israel which triggered 
subsequent conflict between Israel and the US (as well as the Palestinians): the 
Soviet Jewish emigration. However, this new issue did not change the nature of 
Israel‟s top national interests but just served as strong Israeli excuses to practice its 
interest to maximize territories. In other words, the US-Israeli alliance relationship 
faced substantial challenges only from the change of both US top interests (unit 
attributes) and polarity in the international system (structure).  
4.2.1  Disputes over Israeli settlements: A hint? 
The first apparent hint of the new US-Israeli tension appeared in the US 
affirmative vote in UNSC Resolution 607 (Jan 5, 1988), which opposed Israel‟s plan 
to deport nine Palestinian leaders in the First Intifada.
104
 However, this rare US 
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support for a UNSC resolution which was unfavourable to Israel was certainly not 
decisive to the maintenance of alliance relationship. It was closer to a hedging move 
rather than a real restraining effort towards Israel. The US faced neither a threat nor a 
real interest in the case so it was basically not motivated to substantially restrain 
Israel. That could explain why the US did not vote in favour but abstained in the 
subsequent UNSC Resolution 608 (Jan 14, 1988) which echoed on the same issue.  
Yet the Jewish settlement issue sparked a series of real diplomatic conflicts 
between the Bush I administration of the US and the Shamir administration after the 
outbreak of the First Intifada. Since the Soviet Jews rushed into Israel at the end of 
Cold War, the Shamir administration wanted to accommodate the immigrants by 
building settlements beyond the 1967 border. The act violated the established US 
principle that Israel should retreat beyond the green line in accordance with UNSC 
Resolution 242 in the long term. In a speech delivered towards AIPAC on May 22, 
1989, US Secretary of State James A. Baker criticized Shamir‟s plan for a greater 
Israel as “unrealistic”.105  
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There was an argument that Baker‟s speech unfairly made more specific 
demands on the Palestinians than on the Israelis
106
, but we should understand that 
Baker had to soften the critical tone against Israel in a speech delivered towards such 
an influential Jewish lobby group. Indeed Baker has already shown the clear stance 
of the Bush I administration against Israel‟s expansionist approach on Jewish 
settlements. Yet this hedge failed to restrain Israel. Indeed, Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir even once claimed that “big immigration requires Israel to be big as 
well” on January 14, 1990.107  
George H. W. Bush became the first US president to single out East Jerusalem 
over the settlement issue
108
 when he publicized the US view of East Jerusalem as 
Israel‟s non-sovereign occupied territory in a press conference on March 3, 1990109. 
This was a strong restraining message threatening Israel to concede. Yet the Shamir 
cabinet strongly reacted with the rejection of Baker‟s peace talk plan. In the 
subsequent few weeks, Shamir weathered a governing challenge from the Labour 
Party and formed an even more right-wing cabinet.
110
 On the other hand, Bush also 
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faced domestic pressure from disagreements from both the Congress and the media. 
He eventually softened his stance and put the argument on the final status of 
Jerusalem aside.
111
 The settlement disputes apparently disturbed the US-Israeli 
relationship. US pressure on Israel continued when it voted in favour again of the 
UNSC Resolution 672 on October 12, 1990, which condemned Israel for killing 20 
Palestinians in Jerusalem and demanded an investigation by a UN mission.  
4.4.2  The First Iraq War: A favourable turn?  
However, the subsequent First Iraq War gave the two governments a chance 
to remedy the deteriorating relationship. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on 
August 1990, the Bush administration was determined to build an international 
military coalition which involved Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. 
However, Israel could produce an entrapment scene to the US if it retaliated to Iraq‟s 
missile attacks where were to begin after fighting started in January 1991. The Arab 
states, especially Saudi Arabia, had already borne high domestic pressure for 
allowing US troops entering their territory. The US military entrance into Mecca, the 
holiest site in Islam, brought an even more serious backlash from global Muslims. As 
the Arab public generally harboured a strong hatred against Israel, Israel would have 
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intensified the predicament of the Arab states had it entered the battlefield. Then the 
Arab states might have to succumb to domestic pressure and withdraw from the 
US-led coalition. To ensure restoration of regional stability with the help of other 
Arab states, the US government needed to restrain Israel from retaliation.  
The US adopted a sophisticated restraining strategy to ensure Israel would not 
attack Iraq. As Snyder has proposed, there is a standard response and an alternative 
response vis-à-vis entrapment. The standard response for the US was to move away 
from Israel through loosening its commitment or threatening support withdrawal 
while the alternative one was to give an even firmer commitment to Israel. The Bush 
administration adopted both measures sophisticatedly.  
In the pre-war period, the US restraining efforts generally followed the 
alternative response of enhancing commitments to Israel. For example, US President 
George H. W. Bush first repeated its commitment to Israel‟s security on September 
27, 1990.
112
 It was a reasonable act as Israel in the early diplomatic exchanges of 
views with the US showed a strong determination to retaliate against any Iraq attack. 
Israel looked “unrestrainable” at this stage and using an alternative response would 
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be more appropriate.
113
 This message in more hedging sense was certainly not 
strong enough to dissuade Israel from retaliation. The Bush administration further set 
up a secure communications link called “Hammer Rick” between defence officials of 
both states. This substantial enhancement of commitment basically dissuaded Israel 
from any pre-emptive attack over Iraq without consulting the US.
114
 When the war 
against Iraq became inevitable, the US government sent a delegation, including 
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger and Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Paul Wolfowitz, to Israel with further commitments of positive incentives. Then 
Israel promised again to consult the US before using force against Iraq.
115
 On 
January 15, 1991, President Bush even signed National Security Directive 54 which 
declared that: “Should Israel be threatened with imminent attack or be attacked by 
Iraq, the United States will respond with force against Iraq and will discourage Israeli 
participation in hostilities”.116 In other words, the US showed determination of 
restraining Israel no matter whether it was attacked by Iraq or not.
117
  
                                                 
113
 Snyder argued that when “the ally is deemed unrestrainable”, one had better take the alternative 
response vis-à-vis entrapment scene.  
114
 Scott B. Lasensky, “Friendly Restraint: US-Israel Relations during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991”, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no.2 (Jun 1999): 27.  
115
 Scott B. Lasensky, “Friendly Restraint: US-Israel Relations during the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991”, 
Middle East Review of International Affairs 3, no.2 (Jun 1999): 27.   
116
 National Security Directive 54 (Jan 15, 1991).  
117
 Jeremy Pressman, Warring Friends: Alliance Restraint in International Politics (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2008), 110.  
73 
 
When the war broke out, the Bush administration made stronger restraining 
efforts through five positive measures (i.e. the alternative responses) and one 
negative measure (i.e. the standard response). First of the five positive inducements, 
“Hammer Rick” served for both quick consultations and early US warning of Iraq‟s 
Scud attack to Israel. Second, Eagleberger and Wolfowitz were sent to Israel again to 
reiterate the US commitments to Israel and put pressure on Israeli leaders to avoid 
retaliation. Third, the US immediately sent emergency military support, especially 
the US-operated Patriot anti-missile batteries, to Israel. Fourth, the US lured Israel 
with extra financial aid to compensate for Israeli losses in Iraqi attack. Fifth, the 
US-led coalition forces continuously underwent Scud-hunting operations over 
Western Iraq. The only US negative measure was to “withhold key operational 
intelligence information the Israeli needed to carry out their retaliatory plans”.118 
The first, third and last positive measures practised commitment before the outbreak 
of war while the second and fourth ones raised the US commitment to Israel. All of 
them, as alternative responses to entrapment risk, aimed to make Israel more 
confident and relaxed vis-à-vis the Iraq‟s missile threats.  
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Indeed it was not easy for the US to restrain Israel through the negative 
measure. When Israel suffered several Scud attacks, it attempted to retaliate but the 
US refused to cooperate. However, the Bush I administration first banned Israel‟s 
requests for the identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) codes and any air corridors to reach 
Iraq. Then US top officials continuously declined Israel‟s request for approval of 
retaliation. Israel even needed to cancel several individual attack operations in late 
January because the US was unwilling to cooperate.
119
 The negative measures, as a 
standard response to entrapment risk, ensured Israel would not abandon its 
forbearance from retaliation. After all, reckless Israeli military operations might 
wrongly attack coalition forces or even destroy the US-led coalition by violating 
Jordanian or Saudi airspace.
120
  
However, the key reason why Israel agreed to be restrained by the US was the 
Shamir cabinet‟s trust in the US capability of regional balancing. If Israel did not 
believe the US-led coalition could ensure its ultimate security, it would not have 
tolerated the early assaults of Iraq. To Israel, the US was always the most decisive 
actor in regional balancing resulting in a favourable situation. Its strong dependence 
on the US to balance Saddam‟s Iraq conferred on Israel a rather weak position on this 
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issue. Besides, Israel was bound by its commitment of consulting the US before any 
retaliation. Furthermore, Israel would not possess any important interests when its 
casualties‟ risk was successfully minimized by the US. On contrary, the Shamir 
cabinet could ingratiate itself with the Bush administration to strengthen the alliance 
relationship, which would be a more important Israeli interest. Thus Israel had only 
accumulated very little relative bargaining power on the issue of whether retaliate to 
Iraq or not. As a result, the US had successfully restrained Israel from retaliating 
against Saddam‟s provocations.  
4.2.3  Madrid peace process: Financial restraint 
The honeymoon of the above successful alliance management attempt during 
the First Iraq War did not even really get started before the Bush I administration 
showed its eagerness to revive the Israeli-Palestinian process. For instance, US either 
did not employ its veto or even supported UNSC resolutions which condemned Israel 
for its policies and practices which harmed the human and political rights of the 
Palestinians, until a replacing security coalition was organized amongst only Arab 
coalition members, excluding the US in April 1991.
121
 Yet the previous settlement 
issue was the real overriding stumbling block. Bush reiterated the steady US stance 
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calling for “comprehensive peace” based on UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. While 
he committed the US again to both “Israel‟s security and recognition” and 
“legitimate Palestinian political rights”, he did not yet mention a Palestinian state.122  
After Israel expressed its request for $10 billion in US loan guarantees for 
accommodation of Soviet Jewish immigrants
123
, Baker clearly showed his view by 
arguing in a house subcommittee on May 22, 1991, “I don‟t think that there is any 
bigger obstacle to peace than the settlement activity that continues not only unabated 
but at an enhanced pace”124 and Bush reiterated this view the following day125. Yet 
mere hedging-sense pressure would never move the Shamir administration. The 
Shamir cabinet perceived a relatively much stronger interest in constructing 
settlements beyond the green line than the Bush administration did. While the Bush 
administration did not want to give up a militarily reliable ally like Israel, it needed 
more determination to break its restricted relative bargaining power in the settlement 
issue.  
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As a failed coup weakened Mikhail Gorbachev‟s authority in the Soviet 
Union and brought the communist pole close to disintegration, the US could then 
marginalize the Soviet role in the peace process.
126
 Therefore the US interest in 
regional stability, involving a peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians, in the 
Middle East was no longer restrained by the fading top interest of anti-communism. 
Therefore Bush made a real restraining effort against Israel on September 6, 1991, 
when he asked Congress for a 120-day postponement before considering Israel‟s 
request.
127
 He even challenged AIPAC, the most influential Israeli supporter going in 
the US by publicizing the diplomatic need of the 120-day delay request for the peace 
process and emphasized his constitutional authority to handle foreign policy in 
mid-September.
128
 As a result, US diplomatic pressure and a firm stance against 
settlement expansion finally left the Shamir cabinet no choice but to participate in the 
Madrid conference which brought Israel together with its immediate Arabs 
neighbours.
129
  
However, it did not mean that Israel had to make concession on every issue. 
The US also took its ally‟s demands into account. The proposal from the Bush I 
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administration for the negotiation details included significant terms favourable to 
Israel, e.g. refusing active UN participation, postponing negotiations on the definitive 
status of both sides, and even informalizing the principle of “land for peace”, in order 
to restrain the Shamir cabinet at the negotiation table in a better-looking way.
130
 
After all, the negotiation between the Israelis and the Palestinians was a long process 
and there was no urgent need for the US to restrain Israel in full-scale way. Indeed 
the change of the power balance after the First Gulf War also contributed to this 
development as Israeli security emergency decreased and the bargaining power of the 
Palestinians was severely weakened after wrongly supporting Saddam Hussein. Yet it 
was already a diplomatic victory for the Bush administration to restrain the Shamir 
cabinet at the negotiation table “with definite proposals”, which was indeed “a task 
which Israel considered taboo”.131  
Although the US had already made sophisticated efforts, the Madrid peace 
process was unpromising. The Bush administration seemed to ascribe, at least 
partially, the responsibility for the peace talk hindrance to the Shamir cabinet. This 
might explain why it showed a clear preference to Shamir‟s rival, Yitzhak Rabin of 
the Labour Party, during the 1992 Knesset elections. The Bush administration even 
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restricted Israel‟s demanding loan guarantees with conditions apparently 
unacceptable to the Shamir cabinet and rejected Congress mediation, preventing 
Shamir from taking advantage of this for his election campaign.
132
 Rabin eventually 
replaced Shamir as the Israel‟s Prime Minister in July 1992. Rabin quickly 
announced the cancellation of over 6000 housing units of planning settlements and 
reduction of subsidies on the remainder, although around 10000 units of constructing 
settlements would be retained and completed. Yet this was sufficient for the Bush I 
administration to lift its blockage to the loan guarantees.
133
  
This loan guarantees saga was a typical example of how the US and Israel 
managed their relationship. The unrestricted interest of regional stability owing to the 
end of the War raised the US concern about the peace talks between the Israelis and 
the Palestinians. As territorial distribution would determine the result of the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the US had a strong interest in restraining Israel 
from implementing the plan to expand settlements beyond the green line. Perhaps 
Israel still had a relatively more intense interest in the settlement issue, yet such 
difference would then be neglectable when taking Israel‟s high dependence (partially 
shown in its invulnerability to the US threat of withdrawing certain financial 
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assistance) and US low (or even no) commitment on the same issue into account. 
Therefore while the US was more willing to convert its power resources into 
capabilities to restrain Israel, the relative bargaining power of the US boomed. A 
rightist cabinet would rather fight on with the tension with the US but still needed to 
concede if the US restraining efforts were strong enough. A moderate cabinet might 
rather choose to cooperate in exchange of a more friendly relationship with the US in 
order to gain more assistance. Financial assistance was a pivotal means of the US 
government to restrain Israel in the above cases. Even Shamir survived from the 
challenge from Rabin, he probably could not withstand the foreseeable increase of 
US restraining efforts. Indeed Bush was backed up with broad domestic support to 
restrain Shamir through holding loan guarantees, including from the favourable poll 
results and even editorial support from the national newspapers.
134
  
4.2.4  Oslo peace process: False hope 
Bush lost his presidency soon after Rabin replaced Shamir. His successor, Bill 
Clinton, followed the direction of promoting Middle East peace by facilitating the 
Israeli-Arab peace process (especially the Israeli-Palestinian one). Fortunately, his 
early opponent was Rabin, a moderate Israeli leader compared with Shamir, and this 
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probably made Clinton‟s task easier. Yet Rabin was a pragmatic politician with his 
own political considerations. For instance, he was deliberately absent from the 
Knesset vote on repealing the ban on private Israeli contacts with the PLO, motivated 
by the dovish Mashov faction in the cabinet, hinting his reluctance at the decision. 
He had been worried of Bush‟s exploitation of this ban lifting but felt relieved after 
Bush was defeated in the presidential election.
135
 However, he did not refuse either 
the creation of the Palestinian Authority or even the return of Yasser Arafat to the 
West Bank, unlike the firm opposing stance of his predecessor.
136
  
The Clinton administration continued the previous conception of achieving 
regional stability through regional peacemaking. Yet modus operandi of the Clinton 
administration was different from that of Bush, which allowed lower-ranked officials 
to enter the core decision-making circle.
137
 Martin Indyk
138
 was one of the most 
influential Middle East experts in the Clinton administration.
139
 His views could 
closely represent the rationale of Clinton‟s Middle East policy: first, the Clinton 
administration observed an opportunity to achieve a comprehensive regional peace 
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and thus temporarily gave up the long-term goal of democratization in the region; 
second, regional leaders would lose the excuse of Arab-Israeli conflicts to delay 
domestic political reforms, whose possible destabilizing effect was unbearable to the 
US, meanwhile, owing to the significance of regional stability in the oil-rich Middle 
East.
140
 This could explain how regional stability, a top Middle East interest of US, 
was linked with the US active role in facilitating Israeli-Palestinian peace process in 
Phase I.  
The Clinton administration successfully persuaded Israel to restart the broken 
peace process in Washington. However, the Palestinians at the negotiating table had 
insufficient representativeness owing to the lack of authority from the PLO.
141
 This 
eventually forced Rabin to reluctantly accept direct talks with the PLO, yet without 
direct involvement of Arafat from spring 1993. With the help of secret Norwegian 
facilitations and, equally important, the pragmatism of both the Israeli government 
(with special credits to Rabin and Shimon Peres) and the PLO (with special credits to 
both Arafat, the decision-maker, and Mahmoud Abbas, the hidden architect), 
Israeli-Palestinian peace talks strove for a breakthrough.
142
 Although the Clinton 
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administration was informed of this secret peace process, it was indifferent to the 
“sideshow” and did not get involvement until a final agreement between both sides 
was reached.
143
 We could see how willing the Rabin cabinet was to reach a peace 
agreement with the Palestinians, even without Clinton‟s involvement.  
On the other hand, the Clinton administration seemed to be tolerating Israel‟s 
acts which might impair the peace process. For the first example, Israel expelled 413 
Palestinians to Lebanon in December 1992. Eventually the Clinton administration, 
which has just started its tenure in January 1993, diplomatically protected Israel from 
UNSC sanction. Second, Israel isolated four districts in the occupied territories in 
March 1993 and made the Palestinian residents suffered from financial hardship but 
the US was indifferent to the issue. Third, Israel unilaterally attacked southern 
Lebanon, causing severe casualties and destructions with no substantial restraining 
efforts from the US.
144
 The above cases did not really impair the peace process and 
therefore the Clinton administration had no incentives to restrain Israel. The US 
tended to react passively to Israel‟s action. One might argue Israel was free-riding. 
Yet the US had no interest and no capability to constrain every move of its ally. It 
would intend to restrain Israel only when Israel‟s deeds challenged the US top 
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interests. In other words, the US seldom counteracted with Israel unless it felt it was 
being entrapped by Israel‟s acts. Rabin was indeed willing to reach an eventual peace 
agreement with the PLO and that was why he accepted the secret top-level 
negotiations held in Oslo. He would therefore acutely control the negative impact of 
the above cases for both the Madrid and Oslo peace processes. The Clinton 
administration knew Rabin‟s pragmatism and thus would harbour more tolerance of 
Israel.  
The Clinton administration continued its facilitating efforts after the signing 
of Oslo I
145
 declaration in 1993 but in vain. Yet the Rabin cabinet and PLO carefully 
followed the Oslo track and finally signed the Oslo II
146
. As the result was favourable 
to the US interests, there were no tensions between the Clinton administration and 
the Rabin cabinet. However, Rabin was assassinated on November 4, 1995. This was 
a turning point in Israeli domestic politics as the Likud hardliner Benjamin 
Netanyahu eventually defeated Peres, Rabin‟s successor in the Labour Party, in the 
mid-1996 election. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process became unpromising since 
then.  
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Netanyahu, like his Likud predecessor Shamir, showed unwillingness to make 
concessions on the settlement issue. For example, he pushed forward the “Guidelines 
of the Government of Israel” in June 1996, which granted the Jewish settlements in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with a permanent status of “national importance to 
Israel‟s defense and an expression of Zionist fulfilment.”147 This not only violated 
UNSC Resolution 242 but also challenged the steadfast US request for Israel to obey 
the above resolution. However, Netanyahu, unlike Shamir during the Bush I era, at 
least showed willingness to hold talks with the PLO, and even directly with Arafat.   
Shortly after Netanyahu became Israeli Premier, Clinton entered his campaign 
of presidential re-election and secured a victory over Bob Dole‟s challenge. Although 
he faced a counteracting Republican-dominated Congress, his reputation as a friend 
of Israel from the previous efforts to facilitate Arab-Israeli peace talks offered him 
more space to manoeuvre. If he could maintain his security commitment to Israel, he 
would still have enough personal political counters to bargain with Netanyahu even 
under the constraints of Congress.
148
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Before the start of Clinton‟s second tenure, there was another breakthrough in 
the peace process. During the Washington Summit in early October 1996, the Clinton 
administration managed to defuse the small-scale Israeli-Palestinian violence, 
stimulated by Israeli unilateral opening of the Hasmonean Tunnel, and restart the 
peace process.
149
 Finally, on January 15, 1997, Israel and the PLO initialled the 
Hebron Protocol. Both the US and Israel governments conceded in some way. While 
Netanyahu reluctantly accept further Israeli withdrawal under US pressure, the US 
also agreed to include a “Note for the Record” written by Dennis Ross150 which 
stated Israeli commitment to Oslo II “on the basis of reciprocity”. Israel was likely to 
take advantage of that because it provided justifications for Netanyahu in case he 
wanted to suspend the peace process. Although the PLO also enjoyed this 
justification, the situation would be unfavourable for them to do so.
151
 However, it 
was the PLO which decided to suspend the talks first after Israel announced new 
plans for settlement construction in March 1997. Israel also suspended the peace 
process after the two suicide bombs exploded in West Jerusalem on July 30 and 
September 4. The efforts of Madeleine Albright, then secretary of state, to seek a 
bilateral diplomatic truce were futile as Netanyahu retained his strong stance on 
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settlements.
152
 What the Clinton administration did was only a gesture: Clinton 
refused to meet with Netanyahu who visited the US in November. Such a gesture has 
no tangible restraining impact on Netanyahu.  
4.2.5  1998-1999: Distractions  
In the years of 1998 and 1999, the Clinton administration was de-motivated 
from facilitating the Israeli-Palestinian peace process owing to both domestic 
(Clinton‟s sexual scandal) and international (the Kosovo War) distractions. As the US 
interests were less intense in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, its relative 
bargaining power over Israel was weakened in the issue. Therefore Israel was less 
likely to be restrained by the US. Besides, the Palestinian side was somewhat 
unrestrainable too. Yet an Israeli-Palestinian dispute would not bring tensions to 
US-Israel relationship if the US government viewed the Palestinian side as bearing 
more responsibilities for such a situation.  
Clinton was pulled into the sexual scandal and the subsequent impeachment 
crisis around Monica Lewinsky. Besides, he received more severe antagonisms in the 
Congress in which both houses were controlled by the Republicans. If the sexual 
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scandal had distracted him, an antagonizing Congress would have constrained his 
policy implementation. For instance, the Clinton administration had no reactions 
even though Netanyahu rejected an underground US proposal including certain 
Israeli territorial withdrawal.
153
 It was not until the Republicans lost five house seats 
to the Democrats in the November mid-term election that Clinton could feel slightly 
relieved over the congressional antagonisms, even the Republicans still maintained a 
slim majority in the House of Representatives. An antagonistic Congress limited the 
restraining measures that the Clinton administration could adopt. For instance, it was 
difficult for Clinton to use financial assistance as a negative measure to restrain a 
disobedient Netanyahu, as his predecessor had done to Shamir.  
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration still managed to make some progress 
in the Wye River Summit. Arafat and Netanyahu (as well as Israel‟s foreign minister 
Ariel Sharon) accepted an invitation to meet with Clinton and his colleagues in 
mid-October 1998. Netanyahu and Arafat eventually succumbed to small-scale 
compromise under Clinton‟s skilful diplomatic pressure, which included both the 
help of King Hussein of Jordan and the storming-out in front of both leaders after 
nights of fruitless negotiations.
154
 Yet the finally-reached Wye Agreement was still 
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interim in sense, for it only included security commitment and partial National 
Charter revocation from the Palestinian side, and gradual conditional territorial 
withdrawals and certain prisoner release from the Israeli side.
155
 Indeed, the attitude 
of the Clinton administration was nearer to hedging rather than restraining. It never 
forced the Netanyahu side to give up its conditional offer to retreat after the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) first controlled violence against Israel. Indeed the 
violence towards Israel was mostly from Hamas, a terrorist group beyond the PA‟s 
control. Yet the Netanyahu cabinet often wanted to make use of non-PA attacks 
towards Israel to suspend its negotiations with the PA. The Clinton administration 
chose to tolerate but not break Netanyahu‟s excuses owing to consideration of its 
domestic constraints. For instance, when Netanyahu decided to suspend 
implementation of the Wye Agreement under domestic pressure, Clinton was fighting 
against the Senate attempts of impeachment. Clinton could not spare any 
concentration to restrain Netanyahu from doing so.  
Indeed the Kosovo crisis was developing and deteriorating during Clinton‟s 
impeachment crisis. The Clinton administration was distracted until the US was 
forced to intervene in the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo as Serb president Slobodan 
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Milosevic was believed to carry out ethnic cleansing against the Albanians there.
156
 
Then the Clinton administration exploited its diplomatic energy on organizing a 
NATO-led military coalition to bombard Yugoslavia. Although the US owned 
hegemonic power resources, it could not always mobilize them into capabilities to 
cope with matters all over the world. The US government had to distribute its power 
mobilization according to the urgency of foreign affairs. The Kosovo War ranked US 
top priority in foreign policy at that period of time and thus further distracted the 
Clinton administration from mediating or facilitating the unpromising 
Israel-Palestinian peace process until it had forced Milosevic to retreat from Kosovo 
with the help of Russia by June 1999.  
In addition, the Kosovo crisis also attracted the eyes of both the Israelis and 
the Arabs. The Arabs apparently would concern as the Albanians in Kosovo were 
mostly Muslims. They even compared the plight of the Kosovars with that of the 
Palestinians.
157
 To the Israelis, the concern was more complicated. They had 
sympathy to the Kosovars as the ethnic cleansing suspicions recalled the Jewish 
history of the Holocaust. Yet some, as represented by Foreign Minister Ariel Sharon, 
worried that the possible establishment of an Islamic state in Kosovo would harm 
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global stability. Fortunately, Netanyahu stood firm to support NATO and did not raise 
further diplomatic disputes with the US.
158
  
Furthermore, the Israeli election was scheduled for mid-May 1999, so the 
Clinton administration preferred waiting to acting with the expectation of pragmatic 
Labour candidate Ehud Barak winning over Netanyahu. As a result, what the Clinton 
administration did during in the first half of 1999 was only sending Arafat a letter 
with a further US commitment on facilitating a final-status agreement.
159
 The only 
impact of the letter was the use of the term “partnership” to describe US-Palestinian 
relationship, which boosted fears in the Israeli public and further destroyed 
Netanyahu‟s hope of electoral victory.  
The story of those two years told us that the US could only restrain Israel 
when both domestic and international factors were not constrainable on the 
incumbent administration. Without domestic, especially congressional, support, the 
US administration found it difficult to exploit effective restraining measures such as 
negative financial sanctions. The diplomatic energy of a government was limited 
even for a hegemon like the post-Cold War US. Therefore, when the Clinton 
administration was concentrated on a particular issue of significant urgency, 
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especially involving US military actions, it would temporarily reduce its interests and 
lose certain bargaining power on less significant and urgent issues. This could 
explain why Netanyahu could prohibit the Oslo peace process without feeling a 
similar extent of restraints as had Shamir in the Bush era. Yet the Clinton 
administration at least still managed to keep Netanyahu at the negotiation table and 
made several symbolic concessions to the Palestinians.  
4.2.6  The final efforts of Clinton: In vain again 
As the Clinton administration hoped, Barak won the election. Barak spent 
some more time to form a strong Knesset before resuming negotiations with the 
Palestinians. Barak, despite also regarded as a pragmatist like Rabin, was not a 
supporter of Oslo. To fight for a more favourable bargaining position, Barak first 
criticized the US for over-involvement in the recent Wye River Summit, exceeding 
its facilitating role to sometimes be judge and arbitrator. He also preferred an overall 
agreement to an incrementalist approach of retreating by little and little. He even 
asked Clinton to accept deferral of Wye implementation to save his political capital 
for future negotiations. Clinton responded positively with a reiteration of its role 
solely facilitating and a further commitment of military support.
160
 In this case, the 
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sophisticated alliance management between Israel and the US ensured mutual 
understanding and compromise. This prevented reoccurrence of tension like during 
the periods of Bush-Shamir and Clinton-Netanyahu times. The Clinton 
administration was willing to accept Barak‟s preference because those concessions 
were not only harmless to the US top regional interests but also favourable to boost 
Israeli willingness to participate in the peace process, which would in turn 
consolidate the US interest of regional stability.  
However, the Israeli government only focused on the negotiations with the 
Syrians during the early Barak tenure. Barak only contributed to the peace process 
with the Palestinians by signing the Sharm al-Sheikh memorandum for 
implementation of the Wye agreement in September 1999.
161
 Yet Israel and Syria 
failed to reach an agreement in the corresponding Geneva Summit in March 2000. 
Then Barak decided to withdraw from South Lebanon for security calculations in 
May. After that the Israelis resumed negotiations with the Palestinians.
162
 In addition, 
with the strong efforts by Clinton, a summit including Barak and Arafat was held in 
July. During this Camp David II, the US had put pressure on both the Israeli side and 
the Palestinian side for territorial redistribution. Yet the Clinton administration had 
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never restrained Israel to make concessions on East Jerusalem and had even turned to 
the Israel side on the issue. The US winked at the Israeli settlement construction in 
Jerusalem and changed its status from “occupied territory” to “disputed territory”. 
The Congress was even more fanatical to support Jerusalem as “an indivisible capital 
of Israel”.163 The controversy on the status of Jerusalem and the authority over the 
city‟s Arab district was the more significant stumbling block than the settlement 
issues. Although the Clinton administration realized the significance of the peace 
process for maintaining a stable Middle East, it was not willing or did not see the 
significance to restrain Israel to concede Eastern Jerusalem to the Palestinians. Israel 
even seemed to have successfully persuaded the US to back them on the Jerusalem 
issue. Therefore, there was no clear tensions between the US and Israel on the 
Jerusalem issue during the Clinton era.  
When the US tried to force both Barak and Arafat back to the negotiation 
table, Ariel Sharon visited the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount area on September 28, 
2000. As the Palestinians regarded this holy site should be under their control, they 
reacted angrily and finally sparked violence. That was the Second Intifada. The 
Clinton administration could no longer count on the hope to advance peace process 
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but had to seek a quick truce between the Israelis and the Palestinians.
164
 Yet his 
attempts did not change the situation at all. Finally, Clinton proposed a compromise 
plan on the pivotal Jerusalem disputes in December. Yet as Clinton‟s tenure was 
nearly at the end and his successor George W. Bush belonged to his rival party, Barak 
and Arafat had reservations over the Clinton Parameters even both of them showed 
interests in accepting it.
165
 The subsequent Taba Summit eventually started on the 
first day Clinton left office.  
George W. Bush (shortened as Bush II in this chapter), the son of Clinton‟s 
predecessor, succeeded Clinton‟s legacy of the Taba Summit. Yet the talks paused as 
the Israeli election was coming. Hawkish Sharon eventually replaced Barak as the 
new Israeli premier. With low expectations, the Bush administration did attempt to 
resume the peace process. The Mitchell Report published in late April 2001 argued 
that Arafat had no responsibility for the outbreak of the Second Intifada but should 
have done more to stop the subsequent violence, while accusing both Sharon‟s visit 
to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount and Israel‟s settlement expansion beyond the 
green line as provocative. By endorsing the above findings, the Bush II 
administration successfully forced both Israel and Palestine to concede. Yet the 
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violence still escalated and this made the US try to restart the peace process from 
June 2001. Sharon asked Bush II not to push new initiatives but Bush II reacted by 
delaying his decision on new Israeli request for financial aid.
166
 If the situation went 
on, Sharon might have been restrained like Shamir into returning to the peace talks. 
Yet the 9/11 incident in 2001 brought an extraordinary change to nearly everywhere 
over the world.  
4.3  Summary on Phase I 
The end of the Cold War reformed the nature of US top interests in the 
Middle East. As the interest of regional stability was no longer constrained by the 
previously overriding interests of anti-communism, the US started to pursue the 
Arab-Israeli peace process and prevent new Israeli stimulation to its Arabs 
neighbours. The growing conflicts in top interests made the US-Israeli alliance 
relationship more tension-prone. However, the alliance management on military 
action (the First Iraq War) did not bring a negative impact. The series of exchanges 
of ideas contrarily remedied the deteriorating relationship between Bush and Shamir. 
The Israeli-Palestinian peace process was the real weathercock of the US-Israeli 
alliance relationship. Conflicts often broke out when the Israeli government refused 
                                                 
166
 William B. Quandt, Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflicts since 
1967 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 392-393. 
97 
 
to make concessions as the US administration expected. The diplomatic tensions 
between the two states would be intensified if Israel‟s prime minister and the 
majority of his cabinet members were hardliners against territorial concessions to the 
Palestinians. Besides, if the US administration felt fewer constraints or distractions 
from the domestic and international level, it would be able to exert more pressure on 
Israel. The Lewinsky affair and the Kosovo War had distracted the Clinton 
administration from making more significant progress in the peace talks.  
However, the US administration preferred as a facilitator rather than an 
arbitrator in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Therefore, the US seldom exerted 
unilateral pressure on Israel at the negotiation table after Bush I restrained Shamir 
into joining the Madrid peace conference. Even hawkish Netanyahu could only 
hinder the peace process but still needed to talk with Arafat. Besides, even though the 
US would pressurize Israel when needed, it would still let Israel concede in a 
face-saving way by taking Israel‟s ideas into account, especially on the Jerusalem 
issue.  
The US-Israeli alliance relationship experienced a general downturn during 
Phase I. Restraining was the most commonly used measures by the US in the issue of 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, where it was easy for the US and Israel to have 
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conflicts of interests. However, the downturn never caused danger of the breakdown 
of the alliance relationship. The most apparent answer was that Israel has kept 
showing willingness in negotiations with the Palestinians. There was also no urgency 
for the US to give up Israel as its ally. After all, there were still other regional 
challengers in the Middle East, e.g. Iran, Iraq and even Syria, for which the US 
needed Israel for regional balancing. Furthermore, there was no domestic support for 
abandoning Israel after the victory of the Cold War. In short, the US-Israeli alliance 
relationship in Phase I was somewhat weakened but remained basically stable.  
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Chapter 5 Alliance management in Phase II: after 9/11 incident  
5.1  Comparison on US and Israeli top interests 
The most direct impact of the 9/11 incident to US strategic perception was the 
promotion of anti-terrorism to be a top priority. As a retaliating military action 
against al-Qaeda, the chief instigator of 9/11, was inevitable, regional stability in the 
Middle East was destined to be sacrificed for the war on terror. The Iraq War in 2003 
was somewhat a “Bush corollary” to this new rationale of regional strategy, similar 
to the “Roosevelt Corollary” to the Monroe doctrine. The war might not have been 
fought if the Democrats rather than the Republicans had dominated the US 
government during this phase. Yet 9/11 did shock away the resistance in the US 
society to the neo-conservative view of fighting a war in Iraq. This allowed the Bush 
administration to adopt a pre-emptive strike on its perceived “rogue states” like 
Saddam Hussein‟s Iraq. When the US government itself did not view regional 
stability as an important interest, it would be more tolerant to its ally‟s military 
actions, which could mostly exert relatively insignificant impact on the regional 
order. In other words, a lower intensity of US interest on regional stability in turn 
strengthened the relative bargaining power of Israel to launch a military attack.  
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Israel had a long-term interest in anti-terrorism and this interest was closely 
related to the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. Most of Israel‟s unilateral military 
operations also aimed at the neighbouring terrorist groups. Therefore when the US 
began to rank anti-terrorism as a top strategic interest and Israel successfully 
incorporated its conflicts with Hamas and Hezbollah into the US global framework 
of anti-terrorism, the two states had a much more convergent interest on the issue. As 
terrorism was closely interrelated with its peace talks with the Palestinians, Israel 
could enjoy fewer restraints from the US on the peace process. Furthermore, Israel 
could share its intelligence of Middle East terrorists and its anti-terrorist experience 
with the US government. This increased the US dependence and interest on the 
strategic value of Israel in its war on terror. As a result, the bilateral relationship 
between the US and Israel was highly consolidated in Phase II.  
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Figure 5.1: [Post-Cold War] US top regional interests in the Middle East and 
Israeli top national interests  
US Israel 
Reliable oil access  Jewish majority in controlled territories 
Israel‟s security  Inter-state conventional weaponry attack prevention 
WMD non-proliferation  WMD attack prevention 
Regional Stability  Anti-terrorism 
 Territories and resources maximization 
 
Figure 5.2: [Post-9/11] US top regional interests in the Middle East and Israeli top 
national interests  
US Israel 
Reliable oil access Jewish majority in controlled territories 
Israel‟s security Inter-state conventional weaponry attack prevention 
WMD non-proliferation  WMD attack prevention 
Anti-terrorism Anti-terrorism 
 Territories and resources maximization 
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5.2  Internal dynamics of US-Israeli alliance management  
The 9/11 incident forced the US government to raise anti-terrorism as an 
overriding global interest. As the major terrorist threats to the US fundamentally 
originated from the Middle East, the US interest to beat the terrorist challenge even 
pulled regional stability down as a secondary US interest in the Middle East. 
Therefore it reduced US interest to enhance the peace process and thus resulted in 
lower conflicts of interests between the US and Israel. Furthermore, Israel was 
knowledgeable on anti-terrorism through its historical conflicts with the Palestinians 
and the Lebanese. It managed to merge its interests on anti-terrorism around its 
neighbours with the US global framework of anti-terrorism after 9/11. This boost in 
commonality of top national interests thus consolidated the US-Israel alliance 
relationship.  
5.2.1  Marginalization of Arafat 
The 9/11 incident should have distracted the Bush II administration on both 
domestic and international levels. Bush and his team had to focus on the immediate 
responses required by the US public. Besides, the incident triggered an inevitable 
war in Afghanistan against al Qaeda and the Taliban which would exploit US 
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diplomatic energy. However, the Bush II administration still managed to retain some 
efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Thanks to the insistence of Secretary 
of State Colin Powell, who pointed to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as one of the 
“root causes” of terrorism, Bush decided to share his concentration on the peace 
process by working out a “vision” for a two-state solution, apart from preparing for 
the War on Afghanistan. However, Bush did not oppose to the proposal of the 
neo-conservatives to spread the frontline to Iraq but wanted to try Powell‟s plan 
first.
167
   
The Bush administration demanded Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Premier, for 
permission for a talk between Shimon Peres and Yasser Arafat. Yet Sharon rejected 
this and instead proposed his willingness to assist in the coalition against terrorism. 
When he argued against being the only one to object to US requests after 9/11, Bush 
simply responded, “When I ask you for A and you suggest B, I consider that a 
refusal.” This forced Sharon to send his son, Omri, and the director-general of the 
Foreign Ministry, Avi Gil, to meet with Arafat.
168
 Sharon later even claimed, "Do not 
try to appease the Arabs at our expense." This provoked Bush with a strong reaction 
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to claim Sharon‟s remarks “unacceptable”. 169  Yet this small tension had no 
shattering effect to the US-Israeli alliance relationship. After all, the two states now 
had a strong similar interest against terrorism and thus had room for cooperation. In 
this early stage of Phase II, the US-Israeli alliance relationship was still adapting to 
the new situation. In this adaptation process, the two states would still have quarrels.  
However, Israel still managed to convince the US of their convergent top 
interests in anti-terrorism even with the sacrifice of the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process after some initial quarrels. In order to persuade the US to derail the peace 
process, Israel made use of the uncontrollable violence in the Second Intifada to link 
up Arafat and his PLO with terrorism. US only showed “expressed reservations”, 
which had no tangible restraining pressure, to Israel‟s act of targeted killings of 
Palestinian terrorist leaders.
170
 Yet Israel‟s act only stimulated more terrorist attacks 
from the Palestinians, but perhaps that was what Sharon expected so as to demonize 
Arafat and his Fatah.
171
 After Fatah-linked al-Aqsa Brigades claimed responsibility 
for a retaliatory terrorist attack to a Jewish settlement in the West Bank, Sharon‟s 
office declared, “Yasser Arafat is no longer relevant to the state of Israel and there 
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will be no more contact with him” on December 12, 2001.172 By portraying Arafat‟s 
challenge to the US determination to fight against terrorism, Sharon had the excuse 
to persuade the Bush administration to marginalize Arafat. Arafat‟s unwillingness or 
inability to control terrorism in Palestine raised US concerns, frustration, and 
disappointment. Therefore Bush announced in late January 2002 that he was 
disappointed with Arafat for his failure to prevent terrorism but allowing potential 
escalation of Palestinian violence against Israel.
173
 Sharon began considering to 
expel Arafat from the Palestinian territories, and some Israelis even wanted to kill 
him. Yet Bush objected to both plans and suggested isolating him was already 
enough.
174
  
Subsequently, Israel launched “Operation Defensive Shield” into the West 
Bank from March 29 to May 3 as retaliation to a Palestinian terrorist attack. The 
Israeli military operation resulted in hundreds of casualties and thousands of arrests 
amongst the Palestinians. Although the US voted for the UNSC Resolution 1405, the 
strong US diplomatic pressure had made UNSC describe the mission as 
“fact-finding” instead of “investigation”. This could be viewed as a diplomatic 
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victory for Israel with US support against the Arab appeals for an investigation.
175
 
The US was clearly endorsing Israeli military action from the viewpoint of 
anti-terrorism. Finally, Bush, though not directly naming out Arafat, “call(ed) on the 
Palestinian people to elect new leaders, leaders not compromised by terror” in a 
speech delivered on June 24, 2002.
176
 Although Arafat refused to admit Bush‟s 
intention of ousting him, Bush administration officials had further confirmed the 
meaning inside Bush‟s speech.177 However, Arafat remained as the President of the 
PA until his death but was put under house arrest in most of his last years of life. The 
US and Israel no longer allowed him to play any significant role in the peace process. 
In William B. Quandt‟s words, the two states “were now fully aligned as allies in the 
war on terror” and Bush now just regarded Arafat as “little more than junior member 
of the axis of evil”.178  
5.2.2  The Road Map as well as the Second Iraq War 
In April 2002, the US decided to join the forum of the Quartet on the Middle 
East (the Quartet) held in Madrid, which involved also the European Union (EU), the 
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United Nations (UN) and Russia. Although the Quartet was initiated by the other 
three parties, the Bush administration still attended this forum as a preparation for the 
future Second Iraq War to reduce its tensions with those partner-rivals in advance and 
as a response to the violent deterioration in the Israeli-Palestinian situation.
179
 
Nevertheless, the United States was still dominating the issue. First, in the same 
speech to urge ousting of Arafat, Bush outlined his principles for advancing the peace 
process. He offered his provisional support to the establishment of a Palestinian state 
until the new authority destroyed Palestinian terrorist groups.
180
 In July 2002, the 
Quartet held another meeting in New York and finally reached a compromise 
between the US request to oust Arafat and the oppositions from the other three 
parties. Arafat would retain a symbolic position, i.e. to stay but be marginalized, and 
a Palestinian state would be formed within three years.
181
 The EU was initially 
allowed to draft a “realistic road map” along the spirit of Bush‟s speech. Yet the EU 
draft was never released and was replaced in September 2002 with the US alternative 
draft
182
, which Bush released on October 15, 2002. The key idea of this draft, as 
concluded by Itamar Rabinovich, was a three-phase settlement scheme: “(1) reform 
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within the Palestinian Authority, Israel withdrawal to the lines of September 2000, 
and Palestinian elections; (2) the formation of a Palestinian state in provisional 
borders and a Palestinian constitution in the course of 2003; and (3) in the course of 
2004 and during the first half of 2005, final status negotiations.”183 Although this 
plan required certain Israeli concessions if it were to be successfully implemented, it 
was indeed a favourable proposal to Israel. As a “performance-based” road map, the 
Palestinians had to first give up both Arafat and intifada before triggering the next 
step of limited Israeli withdrawal on territory. Yet it was Sharon who deliberately 
stimulated the Palestinian intifada by visiting the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount 
area. Besides, Sharon should have clearly known that the violence could never be 
stopped under Israeli regular military operations and targeted killings. Israel would 
not be happy with the requirement of concessions within the plan but was not likely 
to confront the US over such an intrinsically favourable proposal. Yet Sharon faced 
domestic pressure as the Labour Party withdrew from the governing coalition and 
thus could not accept this proposal at this critical moment.
184
 As a result, the US 
delayed the finalization of road map in late 2002 giving the reasons of “heated Israeli 
objections” and continuously requested for further postponements until after first 
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Israeli elections in late January, then the formation of the new government, 
subsequently the Second Iraq War, the nomination of a Palestinian Premier and even 
the establishment of a new PA government.
185
 What the US demanded above were 
all favourable to Israel. The fact of a consolidated US-Israeli alliance relationship 
was so apparent.  
Sharon sophisticatedly managed the US-Israeli relationship by making 
symbolic concessions to the peace proposals. First, he claimed to be ready for 
“painful concessions” to reach a political settlement with the Palestinians. Second, he 
kept a double-handed policy with both dialogue with the Bush administration and a 
parallel one with the leadership of the settlers in West Bank and Gaza. Third, he 
accepted the idea of a Palestinian state even though facing objection from the Likud‟s 
Party Centre, as wished by the Bush administration through its peace proposal 
draft.
186
 Indeed, the peace process since the end of the Cold War already set the 
principle of Israeli territory withdrawal in long term. The question was only how 
much Israel had to concede. So the Bush II administration did not need to restrain 
much, as Bush I did on Shamir, to achieve Sharon‟s public confirmation to the above 
principles. Finally, Sharon managed to almost double Likud‟s seats in Knesset and 
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thus formed a governing coalition without Labour. This gave him further freedom in 
bargaining with the US to minimize the territorial withdrawal.  
On March 19, 2003, the US finally launched the Second Iraq War despite the 
strong opposition from certain European countries. The Second Iraq War did not 
heavily distract the Bush (II) administration to the same extent as the Kosovo War in 
1999 did to the Clinton administration. It was similar to the case of the First Iraq War, 
in which Bush I administration quickly shift attention from Iraq to the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Yet the statement of the similar logic between the 
two cases behind the attempts to shift attention from Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process, as William B. Quandt argued
187
, was not completely correct. First, the 
military operations towards Iraq of the Bush I administration were passive while 
those of the Bush II administration were active. Bush I had already been pressing 
Israel to the negotiation table before the First Iraq War. Therefore it was natural for 
him to restart the peace process soon after the Iraq War. Yet Bush II considered the 
removal of Iraq could facilitate the implementation of the Road Map. Therefore he 
continued his Road Map proposal soon after eliminating Saddam Hussein. Second, 
the US attitudes to Israel in the two cases of the attention shift were different. While 
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Bush I was restraining Shamir to the Madrid peace conference which was 
unfavourable to Israel in that historical context, the Bush II was luring Sharon to 
accept an intrinsically favourable peace proposal. This reflected the difference of 
alliance cohesiveness between the US and Israel in Phase I and Phase II.  
The Quartet finally released the document of “A Performance-Based 
Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” on 
April 30, 2003, soon after Mahmoud Abbas formed the new cabinet of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). Under pressure from the Bush administration, the 
Sharon‟s cabinet agreed to adopt the plan with fourteen reservations on March 25, 
2003.
188
 The Bush administration agreed to all of the Israel‟s reservations, except 
number 6 and 10, which Israel demanded Palestinians to abandon hope of refugee‟s 
“right of return” to Israel and required to exclude any reference to the Saudi initiative 
(for a peace exchange deal of a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 border) 
respectively.
189
 This showed a big US diplomatic concession to Israel. On the 
Palestinian side, Abbas was built above the ground on stilts held by Arafat and had 
no real power over Palestinian security forces. Besides, Hamas, al-Aqsa Martyrs 
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Brigade and other terrorist groups or Fatah factions refused to accept the Road 
Map.
190
  
Soon after that, Bush met with Sharon and Abbas, in an effort to reactivate 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, on the day after a joint meeting with Abbas and 
several Arab leaders, including Jordanian King Abdullah II of Jordan, Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Bahraini King Hamad al 
Khalifa. Yet the meetings were fruitless.
191
 Moreover, the cycle between Palestinian 
terrorist attacks (especially by Hamas) and Israeli retaliation (especially with targeted 
killings) recurred since June 2003.
192
 Although the US wanted to save the situation 
by paying $20 million aid to the PA in August 2003, Abbas eventually resigned and 
was replaced by Ahmed Qurei (or Abu Alaa). Owing to the failure of US efforts to 
restore stability in Iraq and the upcoming presidential re-election, Bush began to be 
distracted away from the peace process. Sharon thus faced no pressure from Bush to 
communicate with Palestinian leaders.
193
  
5.2.3  Sharon’s “unilateral disengagement” plan 
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On December 18, 2003, Sharon declared his plan of “unilateral 
disengagement” in view of the unpromising development of the Road Map. He 
claimed that this plan would “grant maximum security and minimize friction 
between Israelis and Palestinians” without harming Israeli strategic coordination with 
the US.
194
 The Road Map was actually dead after a meeting on January 27, 2004, 
between US and Israeli officials, including US National Security Adviser 
Condoleezza Rice and her aides, Sharon‟s Bureau Chief Dov Weisglass, Israeli 
Ambassador to the US Danny Ayalon and Sharon‟s Foreign Policy Adviser Shalom 
Tourgeman. As Israel could enjoy freedom of action with the frozen peace process, at 
least before the departure of Arafat, Sharon assumed a political victory by getting US 
consent to give up the Road Map.
195
 Then Sharon released a more detailed plan of 
reaching an interim arrangement to relieve the conflict level with the Palestinians. 
Sharon‟s proposal involved three key unilateral Israeli steps: (i) acceleration of 
barrier construction to separate Israel from the area in the West Bank which 
Palestinians were inhabited (in order to reduce terrorist attacks and infiltration), (ii) 
unilateral withdrawal from the entire Gaza Strip, which Israel has already surrounded 
with a barrier, (iii) consolidation of the large settlement blocs in the West Bank to be 
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annexed to Israel.
196
 Although this led to domestic problems for Sharon, he managed 
to win a letter from Bush to relieve its restraints to Israel on the peace talks on April 
14, 2004: “In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major 
Israeli population centres, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status 
negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all 
previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same 
conclusion”.197 Bush even publicly called Sharon‟s plan “bold and courageous”.198  
Although Sharon‟s proposal looked like making concessions to the 
Palestinians, it was more complex than it seemed. First, there were strategic 
considerations on the unilateral disengagement from the Gaza strip. It was very 
unlikely for Israel to annex the region on the final settlement for several reasons: (i) 
severe demographic deficit of Jewish population in the region (0.6% to the 
Palestinian population), (ii) weak Jewish linkage to the region in history, (iii) 
geostrategic advantage to start off military operations from outside than from inside, 
(iv) relatively high casualty toll of Israelis in the region.
199
 The demographic deficit 
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was especially crucial in this case as Israeli maintained its uniqueness of democracy 
in the Middle East. Losing a population majority in Israel would be a fatal blow to 
the Jewish domination of the territory. As discussed in Chapter 2, Israel was suffering 
from an existential threat of the deepening demographic deficit owing to the 
faster-growing Palestinian population. Israel could enjoy a strategic benefit of 
preventing non-Jewish population dilution by withdrawing from Gaza.  
Second, Israeli territorial loss from unilateral disengagement in Gaza would 
be eventually compensated with the partial annexation of West Bank. The settlements 
in the West Bank would only accommodate Jewish people and thus would not disrupt 
the Jewish majority after annexation could be implemented. Sharon‟s proposal was 
basically a unilateral land exchange plan without consent from the Palestinians. 
Despite Rice‟s comment that this was “not consistent with our (the US) 
understanding under the road map”, the Bush administration still supported the 
settlement expansion of areas already with certain development (but not undeveloped 
region).
200
 The closeness between the Bush administration and the Sharon cabinet 
could be understood from this case.  
                                                                                                                                          
2009): 34.  
200
 Steven R. Weisman, “U.S. Now Said to Support Growth For Some West Bank Settlements”, New 
York Times, August 21, 2004.   
116 
 
Third, “the significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace 
process”, as quoted from Weisglass, “and when you freeze that process, you prevent 
the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, 
the borders and Jerusalem”.201 In other words, Sharon indeed had no real interests in 
advancing the peace process with the Palestinians and the ultimate goal of his 
proposal was the distraction of negotiations from the final status with the Palestinians. 
Yet it managed to win support, or at least tacit consent, from the Bush administration. 
Weisglass even claimed this plan had got Bush‟s “blessing” and “ratification” of both 
Houses of Congress,
202
 though the Bush administration had never announced to give 
up the peace process. A possible answer to this situation could be the mixture of the 
lack of formal and direct Israeli declaration to block the Road Map, and also 
distractions to the Bush administration of growing Iraq turmoil as well as the 
presidential re-election.  
5.2.4  Hamas’ electoral victory 
Arafat died on November 11, 2004. Before that moment, Bush had already 
secured for another presidential term. Sharon has successfully marginalized Arafat 
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from the peace process before his eventual death. Although the Bush administration 
tended to support Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, it had not waived its goal 
to facilitate the peace process. Therefore, in the final days of Arafat, the Bush 
administration started to exert pressure on Israel to make certain concessions to 
cement the standing of moderate Palestinian leaders in the coming election. For 
instance, Israel finally defrosted the $40-million tax funds for the PA and agreed on 
military withdrawal from the Palestinian population areas.
203
 However, such kind of 
restraint was so minor that it had no impact on the cohesiveness of US-Israeli 
alliance relationship. It was at most a policy fine-tuning to adapt to a sudden event. 
Before Abbas succeeded his office to the PA President after a Hamas-boycotted 
election in January 2005, the Bush administration further worked to boost the 
Palestinian moderates. It offered a $23.5 million aid to the Palestinian Authority in 
December 2004.
204
 The most direct change owing to the presidential succession in 
the PA was that Abbas was willing to restart peace talks with Israel while Arafat was 
not.  
Despite some ripples happened in the course of time, Sharon and Abbas 
declared a truce in Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. Yet the Israeli side maintained that 
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this was still only a “pre-Road Map situation”. As Sharon lacked enough political 
energy to implement both the Gaza withdrawal and an outpost dismantlement in the 
West Bank, Israel expected Abbas to make the first move of destroying terrorism to 
activate the first stage of the Road Map.
205
 The Bush administration supported this 
round of meetings by sharply increasing US direct aid to the PA to $350 million
206
 
and sending Rice, now Secretary of State, to Israel to maintain pressure on Israel.
207
 
Although there were open differences between Bush and Sharon over the settlement 
expansion in the West Bank, Bush offered tremendous support to Sharon on the Gaza 
withdrawal.
208
 Besides, US did have concerns about the situation after the Israeli 
withdrawal from Gaza and even pressed Israel to ensure a successful transition in 
Gaza. The Bush administration expected this withdrawal to set the basis of a future 
Palestinian state.
209
  
What the Bush administration worried was about correct, for Hamas defeated 
Fatah in the Palestinian parliamentary elections on January 25, 2006. While Hamas 
won 74, i.e. more than a half, of the 132 seats in Palestinian Legislative Council, 
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Fatah only secured 45 of them.
210
 Three weeks before that, Sharon suffered a sudden 
stroke and lost consciousness. Ehud Olmert became the Acting Prime Minister. 
Olmert emphasized Israeli refusal to negotiate with the PA which included armed 
terrorist groups like Hamas. He stated that Israeli-Palestinian peace talks would only 
resume when Hamas disarmed, gave up its claim for Israeli destruction, and accepted 
all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements. The Bush administration clearly 
supported Olmert by reiterating its security commitment to Israel in that the US 
refused to deal with any Hamas-like political party which “articulates the destruction 
of Israel as part of its platform”.211 This conformed to the pattern in Phase II: the US 
and Israel had a strong convergence of interests over anti-terrorism. As Hamas was 
regarded as a terrorist group by both the US and Israel, its legitimate status in 
Palestine would only triggered a common stance of the US and Israel. This would 
further consolidate the US-Israeli alliance. Therefore, it proved what Quandt argued, 
“The unilateralist Israeli „vision‟ has little in common with the one that Bush 
purports to uphold, yet Bush has shown no indication of having a strategy for 
coaxing Israeli leaders into showing more flexibility. In reality, it is the Israelis who 
have been setting the pace for developments on the ground.”212 Indeed Israel could 
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only dominate the peace process when the US put no, or at least insignificant, 
pressure on Israel. Achieving regional stability through promoting the peace process, 
bounded by the top interest of anti-terrorism, was still not an overriding issue to the 
US at this moment.  
As Hamas refused to abandon its hostility towards Israel, the US and the EU 
ceased to pay direct aid to the Hamas-led authority in Gaza since April 2006. The US 
even halted the financial assistance to the Abbas-led government in the West Bank 
for Abbas‟ failure in security force control. Besides, Israel has already been 
withholding an amount of around $50 million per month from the PA.
213
 Abbas 
could not change the situation and the Bush administration eventually accepted 
Olmert‟s proposal to realign the settlements in the West Bank.214 The US just 
retained a similar stance to Olmert‟s proposal as to Sharon‟s previous unilateral 
disengagement plan. From June 2006, Hamas resumed violence against Israel. The 
kidnap of Corporal Gilad Shalit on June 25 sparked a strong Israeli military 
retaliation on Hamas. The Bush administration certainly showed its support to 
Israel‟s “right to defend itself”.215  
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5.2.5  The Second Lebanon War  
Yet Israeli attention switched to Lebanon very quickly. Shortly after a 
“mis-targeted” killing of a Hamas leader Nabil al Shamiah (indeed aimed at another 
Hamas leader), militants from Hezbollah, a Lebanese guerrilla, captured two Israeli 
soldiers after a cross-border action. Israel retaliated with air and artillery strikes, 
subsequently also an army invasion, into southern Lebanon. Hezbollah answered 
with a sustained bombardment of Haifa and other northern Israeli region.
216
 Bush 
described the conflicts as “terrorism and terrorist attacks on a democratic country” 
and further ascribed them to be “inspired by nation states, like Syria and Iran”.217 
Bush‟s attitude hinted at the US expectation to use Israel as an agent of regional 
balancing, not only confronting terrorist groups but also deterring the remaining 
regional challengers.  
Yet the 34-day long Israeli military operations failed to destroy Hezbollah. 
Both sides suffered heavy casualties before UNSC Resolution 1701 was finally 
implemented on August 14, 2006.
218
 Bush first blamed the responsibility on 
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Hezbollah and its state sponsors, Iran and Syria, and then claimed Hezbollah 
“suffered a defeat in the crisis”.219 Yet Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah 
claimed victory later.
220
 The US reaffirmed its commitment to Israel in this conflict. 
The bilateral alliance relationship was thus consolidated.  
On the other hand, the US failed to stabilize the post-war Iraq and faced 
growing casualties of soldiers and other personnel. This triggered a growing 
domestic war-weariness and weakened the popularity of the Bush administration. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld especially attracted criticisms and was asked 
to step down. Rumsfeld finally succumbed to domestic pressure and resigned his 
position on November 6, 2006. The Bush administration announced it on November 
8, after the Republican Party lost its majority in the Congress in the mid-term 
election. Rumsfeld formally quit office on December 16. The Bush administration 
only facilitated a cease-fire agreement in Gaza during the period. Israel launched 
another military operation into northern Gaza on October 31, 2006, some days earlier 
than Rumsfeld resignation, for six days but in vain to stop Palestinian rocket fire 
even with heavy Palestinian casualties. Under international pressure, Olmert and 
Abbas reached a cease-fire agreement on Gaza, with Hamas claiming to “respect”, 
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on November 25. This successfully reduced the cases of rocket fire attack along the 
Israeli border.
221
 The result of the mid-term election was the outburst of US public 
discontent and the resignation of Rumsfeld removed the most significant stumbling 
block for the Bush administration to fit public expectations. At this moment, the end 
of Phase II, which has been developing for a long time, could eventually be 
concluded.  
5.3  Summary on Phase II  
The 9/11 incident bolstered the priority of anti-terrorism in US foreign policy 
in the Middle East. Under the Bush administration, regional stability was turned 
down to be secondary again in Phase II. Although the US was still willing to promote 
the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as shown its support to the Road Map, it would 
consider how to resist terrorism first. This was similar to the situation during the 
Cold War, which any hope of promoting the peace process could be restrained by the 
US ultimate interest of anti-communism. The case in Phase III was just the 
replacement of the interest of anti-terrorism to anti-communism. Therefore the Bush 
administration often demanded the Palestinian side to waive terrorist acts before any 
Israeli concession. The converging top interests of anti-terrorism and the priority 
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decrease of US interest in regional stability relieved the tension-proneness of the 
US-Israeli alliance relationship.  
Owing to the previous rounds of negotiations in Phase I, the US and Israel 
would no longer face tension on whether Israel should enter the peace talks. The 
alliance management within Phase II was vague and subtle since the US and Israel 
had much fewer conflicts of interests. Occasions of security dilemma within the 
alliance thus decreased. Besides, there were mutual needs of regional balancing in 
the alliance. Furthermore, there was stronger cooperation, especially on intelligence 
sharing, between the two states in Phase II. As a result, The US-Israeli alliance 
relationship experienced a general upturn during Phase II.  
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Chapter 6 Alliance management in Phase III: From the US turmoil in 
Iraq 
6.1  Comparison on US and Israeli top interests 
The fall of Saddam Hussein produced a political vacuum in the Middle East, 
especially the Gulf region. The US actions failed to stabilize the turmoil in Iraq. This 
forced the US government to reconsider the significance of regional stability in the 
Middle East. Anti-terrorism and WMD non-proliferation were still top US interests 
but regional stability would no longer be sacrificed. Establishment and the 
subsequent stabilization of a new regional order became urgent especially when the 
US public realized the adverse situations in Iraq. This forced the US government to 
revaluate the significance of regional stability. Unless the domestic stability in Iraq 
and regional order were restored, the US army would still be trapped in Iraq despite 
the stronger and stronger domestic opposition to secure other US top regional 
interests such as oil supply and WMD non-proliferation.  
Besides, the US had to consider the growing Iranian challenging influence in 
Middle East affairs. Iran was believed to be developing nuclear weapons and had 
potential existential threat to Israel. However, as there was still no evidence that Iran 
126 
 
had possessed such technology, there was still no significant effect to regional 
stability. The more urgent Iranian threat to regional stability was its suspected 
linkage with Hamas and Hezbollah, which had consistent conflicts with Israel, and 
its potential impact on the Shiites in post-war Iraq.   
Similar to the case in Phase I, the US found that it had better make certain 
efforts on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in the course of reconstructing 
regional stability. This intensified the US interests in the peace process and thus the 
US could achieve a relatively higher bargaining power on Israel in the issue. On the 
other hand, Israel‟s unilateral military operations could become an unfavourable 
variable when the US wanted to minimize the hot conflicts in the region. Therefore 
the US would have more intensified interests to restrain Israel‟s military actions.  
 However, the US was still restricted by the shared interest of anti-terrorism 
with Israel and thus could only exert limited pressure on Israel. We could observe 
that some of US top regional interests were incompatible in some extent. However, 
neither of those top interests would be sacrificed for the complete achievement of 
another top interest. Therefore the US would find it difficult to strike a balance 
amongst different top interests. That required sophisticated manoeuvre by the US 
officials.  
127 
 
Figure 6.1: [Post-9/11] US top regional interests in the Middle East and Israeli top 
national interests 
US Israel 
Reliable oil access Jewish majority in controlled territories 
Israel‟s security Inter-state conventional weaponry attack prevention 
WMD non-proliferation  WMD attack prevention 
Anti-terrorism Anti-terrorism 
 Territories and resources maximization 
 
Figure 6.2: [Post-US turmoil in Iraq] US top regional interests in the Middle East 
and Israeli top national interests  
US Israel 
Reliable oil access Jewish majority in controlled territories 
Israel‟s security Inter-state conventional weaponry attack prevention 
WMD non-proliferation  WMD attack prevention 
Anti-terrorism Anti-terrorism 
Regional stability Territories and resources maximization 
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6.2  Internal dynamics of US-Israeli alliance management  
The Republicans lost majority in both Senate and House of Representative in 
the 2006 mid-term election, as to pay for the public discontent towards the Iraq War 
launched by the Bush administration. This forced the Bush administration to consider 
regional stabilization again. Therefore the US sought to make further progress in the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. This made the US-Israeli alliance become more 
tension-prone. However, as anti-terrorism remained as a common interest between 
the US and Israel, the alliance relationship of the two states was still very cohesive.   
6.2.1  After resignation of Rumsfeld 
The Bush administration promised to restart its efforts on facilitating the 
peace process between Israel and Abbas‟ side of PA. This was a part of the strategy to 
attract Arab partners to join an anti-Iran coalition to maintain a regional situation 
favourable to the US.
222
 For example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited 
the Middle East to send both Israeli and Palestinian side the message of US view of 
the correct timing to restart peace process.
223
 Rice subsequently maintained its 
efforts to hold talks with Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Yet there were no concrete 
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results in those talks.
224
 The US encouraged Saudi Arabia to help more actively in 
regional diplomacy. Indeed this was a part of the new Middle East policies of the US. 
Yet the resulting Mecca Accord, which attempted to remedy the rift inside the PA, 
was beyond the expectation of Israel and the Quartet. Israel argued that this would 
allow Hamas not to recognize Israel before joining the negotiation.
225
  
Yet the US-backed Saudi efforts successfully softened Israeli attitude to the 
2002 Arab Peace Initiative.
226
 Both Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Foreign 
Minister Tzipi Livni praised the “positive” elements in this initiative.227 The key 
elements in this Saudi plan included a full recognition to Israel, peace offer in 
exchange of Israeli withdrawal to 1967 lines, refugee return according to UN General 
Assembly Resolution 194, and Palestinian state establishment with East Jerusalem as 
the capital.
228
 The US tried to organize moderate Arab states to resist radical terrorist 
groups and promote peace in the region. This was an effort to serve both top US 
interests of anti-terrorism and regional stability. Therefore the US could avoid 
tangible restraints on, and thus reducing tensions with, Israel in facilitating peace 
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process. Yet there were still disagreement between the two allies. For instance, while 
Israel was determined to boycott the whole PA with the involvement of Hamas, the 
US even considered resuming direct international aid to the Palestinian 
government.
229
 Yet the Bush administration was still worried of Hamas so it reduced 
the amount of aids and restricted the ways for the PA to use the money, so that 
Hamas would not receive the money from the US.
230
  
Rice‟s consecutive shuttle diplomacy only made Israel agree to negotiate with 
Palestinians twice a month on day-to-day issues, such as population flow in the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank and arms smuggling, but not on key issues for final 
settlement of peace process, including Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and the 
Palestinian state border.
231
 Under the constraint of the top interest of anti-terrorism, 
it was difficult for the Bush administration to seek a breakthrough in the peace 
process when it viewed the Palestinian side to be involved with a terrorist group like 
Hamas. In other words, the main impetus for the US to push forward the peace 
process, the top interest of regional stability, was diluted by the counter-effect of the 
interest of anti-terrorism. This limited the bargaining power of the Bush 
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administration to exert pressure on Israel in the issue of Israeli-Palestinian peace 
talks.   
The US gradually developed a new strategy towards the Palestinians which 
conformed Israeli interests without totally discarding its interests in promoting peace 
process to stabilize the Middle East. The short unity of Fatah and Hamas to form a 
Palestinian government ended with an escalation of conflicts in May 2007, which 
resulted in the complete control of Gaza by Hamas on June 14. This forced President 
Abbas (Fatah) to dismiss Haniyah (Hamas) as Prime Minister and dissolve the unity 
government. The US certainly stood on Abbas‟ side.232 This shortened the distance 
between the stances of the US and Israel on the Palestinians as the US could now 
treat Fatah and Hamas in separate ways. The US and Israel advocated and remained 
communications with Fatah in the West Bank while opposed and suppressed to 
Hamas in Gaza. Olmert claimed that this could be “a new opening” to the peace 
process.
233
 Following the “West Bank first” strategy, the Bush administration 
advocated the blockage to Gaza with efforts from both Israel and Fatah.
234
 Then it 
unfroze aid to the Abbas side of the PA.
235
 Israel cooperated with the US move by 
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restoring full financial ties with the Abbas-led PA, including tax revenue return.
236
 
Besides, Olmert met with Abbas on July 16. Bush supported it by announcing its 
willingness to assist reform in the PA for future serious peace negotiations. On July 
25, Olmert announced that they would work on an “agreement on principles” for the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, from characteristics of a Palestinian state to the 
nature of future bilateral linkages. Yet there were still disagreements between Olmert 
and Abbas on the negotiating priority of the “final status” of the Palestinian state.237  
6.2.2  The Annapolis Conference 
Nevertheless, the Israelis and the Palestinians still managed to attend the 
Annapolis Conference convened by the Bush administration in late November 2007. 
In this conference with representatives from 49 countries and international 
organizations invited by the US, the Bush administration successfully got the 
involvement of Saudi Arabia, a US ally without formal relations with Israel. Syria, 
despite its unfavourable linkage with Iran, Lebanon and terrorist groups in the region, 
was also invited under the demand from other Arab countries.
238
 This conference 
showed the policy difference of the Bush administration between Phase II and Phase 
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III. First, the size of invitation to the Annapolis Conference was a contrast to the US 
unilateral attitude in the Second Iraq War, which the Bush administration would 
rather form a “coalition of the willing” than seeking approval from the United 
Nations. On the guidance of the reviving top interest of regional stability, the Bush 
administration decided to gather a strong international support in this occasion. 
Second, the inclusion of Syria even broke the “with us or against us” principle of the 
Bush administration. From the exclusion of Iran and Hamas, we could understand the 
sophisticated fine-tune of policy of the Bush administration. As Iran and Hamas 
posed a stronger and more immediate threat to Israel respectively, they would not be 
invited (indeed they had no intention to join too) by the Bush administration. While 
Iran was even facing doubt and hostility from the US, Israel and even the Arab states, 
the invitation to Hamas would deflect the new US “West Bank First” strategy, despite 
the Arab wish of Fatah-Hamas reconciliation. Yet as Syria had a weaker challenge to 
the US interests of anti-terrorism and regional stability, and Israel was not unwilling 
to discuss with Syria, the Bush administration would consider suggestions from the 
Arab friends and invited also Syria to the conference. This could enhance the support 
from the Arab countries and were advantageous to regional stability, which the US 
tried to uphold.  
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Although a “Joint Understanding” on the structure or process of future peace 
negotiations was finally read by Bush in the conference, the result of the mutual 
promise to maintain regular negotiations was not decisive. While Israel won the 
flexibility of making concession dependent on the Road Map implementation, the 
Palestinians won the chance to negotiate issues on final status without the constraints 
of the Road Map implementation. However, Bush described Israel as the Jewish 
homeland. This raised the Palestinian concerns for its possible impact on the future 
talks on refugee return and the status of Israeli Arabs.
239
  
Israel quickly sparked new controversy in early December when it planned 
for new settlement construction in Har Homa, an Israeli-occupied region in southern 
Jerusalem. The issue of East Jerusalem was neglected in the previous negotiations in 
Annapolis and even in the Road Map. Both processes during the Bush administration 
focused on the issue in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. In addition to inevitable 
Palestinian discontent, Rice also openly criticized Israeli decision and said, “We are 
in a time when the goal is to build maximum confidence with the parties and this 
doesn't help to build confidence.” She claimed she wanted to make her position 
“clear” for no prejudgement in final-status negotiations when a new round of peace 
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talks would begin very soon.
240
 Owing to the new need and interest during Phase III 
for the US government to advance the peace process, it tended to show a stronger 
stance against any Israeli acts which might destroy the hope of continuing peace talks. 
However, the Bush administration had no real restraining efforts on Israel.  
6.2.3  After Annapolis 
In Phase III, the US policies and attitude on the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process experienced the dilemma in balancing its somewhat contradictory top Middle 
East interests of both regional balancing and anti-terrorism, which would influence 
the dynamics within the US-Israeli relationship. The achievement of regional 
stability, with an integral part of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, inevitably 
required Israeli concessions and thus would impair the US-Israeli relationship. Yet 
the achievement of the anti-terrorism required technical and intelligence sharing 
from Israel and would increase US dependence on and commitment to Israel. This 
gave the US incentive to consolidate its alliance relationship with Israel. As a result, 
the US needed extra sophistication in handling its policies and attitude on any issues 
related to the peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Such dilemma 
further intensified after the glimmering hope evolved in the Annapolis Conference as 
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the Bush administration did not want to waste this opportunity to secure certain 
historical legacy.  
This was reflected in Bush‟s choice of language during his visit to Israel and 
the PA in early January 2008. To comfort the Palestinians, Bush used the term 
“occupation”, which he did so rarely before, to describe the existence of the Israelis 
in the West Bank and Gaza since the end of the 1967 war. He told Israel “to help, not 
hinder the modernization of the Palestinian security force”, as a support to Abbas 
cabinet and a warning to the Israelis. Besides, he required Israel again to halt 
settlement expansion for the implementation of the Road Map. Yet Bush did not 
forget to comfort the Israelis. For instance, he did not adopt the common usage of the 
“borders of 1967”, which the Arabs preferred, but choose a pro-Israeli usage of “the 
armistice line of 1949”. He also stated no view on the controversial issue of final 
status of Jerusalem, which was apparently favourable to Israel in the context of 
Olmert‟s settlement construction plan in Har Homa and would revive 
Israeli-Palestinian military tensions. The skilfulness of his diplomatic discourse was 
best shown in his subtle criticism with understanding to Israel on the Israeli 
checkpoints and barriers against the Palestinians: “Checkpoints create frustration for 
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people. They create a sense of security for Israel; they create massive frustrations for 
the Palestinians.
241
  
Although the Bush administration showed more criticisms on Israel than 
before, symbolic lip services could only prohibit further Israeli stimulation to the 
situation but had no restraining impact to reverse Israeli unfavourable deeds to the 
peace process. The US and Israel might fall into tensions because of those lip 
services. Yet when the US has no intention to make concrete efforts to restrain Israel, 
its relationship with Israel would still be far from real storm. The lack of such 
intention of the Bush administration could be explained by its limited bargaining 
power in the issue.  
Despite the stronger US interest in promoting peace process in Phase III than 
in Phase II, its dependence on Israel, i.e. US strategic needs on Israel to cooperate in 
the War on Terror, basically remained unchanged. Furthermore, the Bush 
administration had growing dependence on Israel to balance Iran, which brought 
growing threats to all US top interests. First, Iran was determined to develop nuclear 
technology and suspiciously also corresponding weaponry. The Bush administration 
viewed it as a challenge to its interest of nuclear non-proliferation. Second, Iran was 
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accused of backing terrorist groups like Hamas and Hezbollah. This was a fierce 
violation of the US War on Terror. Third, as Iran was a major oil exporter in the 
world, it has the potential to challenge the US interest of stable oil access with 
reasonable price. Fourth, as Iran had growing influence in post-war Iraq owing to its 
Shiite nature, this raised concerns from all of the US, Israel and Sunnis neighbours. 
Therefore, Iran was also viewed as a challenger to the US-dominated regional 
stability. Moreover, as the Shiites controlled the oil-producing region in Iraq, the 
Iranian influence to them would also complicate US oil interest in the Middle East. 
To the US, Israel was the strongest and most reliable ally in the Middle East to 
balance Iran regionally. Therefore Israel was perceived to possess stronger strategic 
value to the US in view of Iranian threat. After all, Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad continued to reiterate his hostility towards Israel. This brought threat, 
yet indeed verbal only, or the sense of danger to Israeli existence, which was also a 
top US interest. Therefore the relative bargaining power of the US to Israel was 
further weakened by its relative increase of dependence on Israel and inevitably 
strengthened its security commitment to Israel. This further constrained the choices 
of the Bush administration towards Israel. Yet the relatively more intense US interest 
in promoting peace process compensated for the above deficiencies. This could 
generally explain why the Bush administration exerted more pressure on Israel in 
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Phase III than in Phase II, but was constrained to hedge or verbal restraints rather 
than tangible restraining efforts like those in Phase I.  
6.2.4  Israeli-Hamas truce  
There was no further breakthrough in the peace process after the Annapolis 
Conference in November 2007 and Bush‟s visit to the region in January 2008. The 
US only managed to pull either Olmert or Abbas back to the negotiation table in case 
a new round of Israeli-Palestinian disputes gave excuses to either side to temporarily 
quit negotiations. For example, Abbas agreed to resume face-to-face talk with Olmert 
under Rice‟s pressure, after one-month withdrawal owing to Israeli incursion into 
Gaza.
242
 The Bush administration had considered fine-tuning its policy towards 
Hamas under the deadlock in the moment. The Bush administration asked Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak in March 2008 to be an intermediary to connect Israel and 
representatives of Hamas into a cease-fire talk.
243
 As discussed above, Hamas was 
not abandoned in the Arab world, and moderate Sunnis powers even hoped Hamas to 
reconcile with Fatah. Besides, Hamas had also softened its hostility to Israel. Its 
leaders claimed that they would propose a long-term truce with Israel if Israelis 
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returned to the 1967 borders.
244
 Therefore it was not unacceptable for the US to 
fine-tune its attitude towards Hamas if both Hamas and Israel showed willingness (or 
at least, could be pressed) to discuss with each other. After all, such fine-tuned 
attitude towards Hamas will be welcomed by Arab allies of the US, despite possible 
Israeli discontent. This again reflected how the Bush administration was struggling in 
balancing between the interests of anti-terrorism and regional stability.     
Egyptian General Omar Suleiman was responsible for mediating the indirect 
talks between Israel and Hamas. The two sides discussed on issues from Palestinian 
rocket fire attacks from Gaza to Israel to Israeli unilateral military action towards 
Gaza, and from Gaza blockage to prisoner exchange. The two sides still managed to 
achieve temporary cease-fire with each other although not every issue was settled. 
Yet the planned six-month ceasefire, which took effect from June 19, 2008, quickly 
faced troubles. Small terrorist groups continued rocket firing to Israeli territory since 
June 24. Those non-Hamas irritations were responded with short-term closures of the 
commercial crossings into the Gaza Strip.
245
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6.2.5  The Gaza War 
The Israeli-Hamas ceasefire expired on December 19, 2008 and Hamas soon 
resumed rocket firing on Israeli territories. After several warnings on continuous 
Hamas attacks, Israel finally retaliated with a military operation, coded with “Cast 
Lead”, in Gaza on December 27. 246  This brought a final test to the Bush 
administration in its last days. Democrat Barack Obama won the November 
Presidential Election and would succeed Bush in January 2009. The Bush 
administration showed strong support to the Olmert cabinet. Rice stated the strong 
US condemnation to “the repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israel” and held 
“Hamas responsible for breaking the cease-fire and for the renewal of violence in 
Gaza”, despite appeals for the restoration of cease-fire.247 This hinted that the US 
perceived Hamas as the chief offender of regional stability and anti-terrorism again. 
Therefore the Bush administration had no intention to restrain Israel‟s military 
actions immediately. Yet the US hoped to limit the scale of Israeli military actions to 
the scale of targeting Hamas militants but also not the civilians. Gordon Johndroe, 
spokesman of the White House stated, “The United States urges Israel to avoid 
civilian casualties as it targets Hamas in Gaza.”248 There was subtle US concern that 
                                                 
246
 Jenny Percival, “Israel launches deadly Gaza attacks”, Guardian, Dec 27, 2008.  
247
 Robert Pear, “White House Puts Onus on Hamas to End Violence”, New York Times, Dec 27, 2008.  
248
 Jenny Percival, “Israel launches deadly Gaza attacks”, Guardian, Dec 27, 2008. 
142 
 
Israeli killings of the Palestinian civilians would trigger regional discontent. This 
might not only shift the focus on countering terrorist groups like Hamas but also 
disrupt regional stability.  
The operation started with coordinated air strikes and later expanded with 
ground force actions from January 3, 2009. This series of military attacks in Gaza 
targeted on not only military facilities but also civilian infrastructure with suspected 
linkages with Hamas.
249
 This inevitably attracted discontent from other states in the 
region, even including Turkey, a rare Israeli ally in the Middle East. The Gaza War 
was the fuse of the future deterioration of the Israeli-Turkish alliance relationship.     
Indeed, the Bush administration expected a durable ceasefire rather than an 
immediate one at this stage.
250
 Yet it did not hope to be entrapped in the after-effect 
of Israeli military action, which was though legitimized with anti-terrorism, e.g. 
deteriorating anti-Americanism in the region. The Bush administration was 
eventually involved into drafting the UNSC resolution which called for ceasefire. Yet 
it surprisingly abstained in the final voting under Israeli pressure, though the 
resolution was still passed. This heavily weakened the pressure exerted on Israel by 
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this resolution, but some still believed that the US still presented its subtle message 
to Israel to support a ceasefire for not vetoing the resolution.
251
 Indeed this again 
reflected the US dilemma on balancing its interests in regional stability and 
anti-terrorism. Retrieving a quick truce could best fit the hope of regional stability 
while the opportunity to hit Hamas hard in the guidance of anti-terrorism goal should 
not be wasted. Therefore a possible real expectation of the Bush administration 
would be a delayed ceasefire for Israel to weaken Hamas as much as possible. This 
could explain why it softened its call for ceasefire at the last minute. It was somehow 
a standard response to the fear of entrapment by threatening to reduce diplomatic 
support. Yet as the fear of entrapment was limited, the commitment refraining was 
also limited. On the other hand, the US Congress also backed Bush‟s stance to Israel 
by passing resolution “recognizing Israel‟s right to defend itself against attacks from 
Gaza”252, following the diplomatic tone of the Bush administration. This ensured no 
domestic pressure on the above manoeuvre of the Bush administration.  
After causing around 1200 Palestinian deaths, Olmert declared ceasefire and 
claimed victory on January 18, 2009
253, two days before Obama‟s presidential 
inauguration. The Bush administration also contributed to the ceasefire. It offered the 
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Israelis a graceful excuse of unilateral ceasefire by accepting Livni‟s initiation of the 
US “agreement to prevent arms smuggling” in the Gaza strip. 254  Hamas 
subsequently announced its own ceasefire for a week
255
 and was believed to 
maintain certain indirect secret talks with Israel soon after that
256
.  
6.2.6  Netanyahu’s return 
Benjamin Netanyahu became the Israeli Prime Minister again since March 31, 
2009. Similar to his last tenure in Phase I, he held a strongly negative attitude to the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Unlike his apparent reluctance to negotiate with the 
Palestinians in Phase I, he actively threw out a peace process approach with three 
“parallel channels” (economic, security and diplomatic) from the very beginning, 
which he later reframed his approach with a triple track (political, security, 
economic). Yet he did not promise a Palestinian state. He also maintained that “peace 
will not come without security” and that “the Palestinians must recognize Israel as a 
Jewish state”.257 His Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman surprisingly argued in 
April 1 that the 2007 Annapolis Joint Declaration was no binding validity owing to 
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the lack of ratification by both the Israeli government and the Knesset. The US only 
responded with reiterating its commitment on the two-state solution.
258
  
After meeting with the visiting Netanyahu on May 18, 2009, Obama 
reiterated its expectation to “achieve a two-state solution in which Israelis and 
Palestinians are living side by side in peace and security”. However, while Obama 
supported Israeli long-term demand for Palestinian security assurances to and Arab 
normalization with Israel, he called for a stop on settlement constructions and 
expressed concerns on the “humanitarian situation in Gaza”.259 Secretary of State 
Hilary Clinton added with a US “two-step efforts”, which first sought to halt 
settlement construction for “additions, natural growth, any kind of settlement 
activity”, and then pushed forward the “two-state solution”.260 The stance of Obama 
administration hinted the upcoming US-Israeli disputes on settlement constructions.  
Responding to the subtle warning of the Obama administration, Netanyahu 
declared on May 21 that “Jerusalem is the eternal capital of the Jewish people, a city 
reunified so as never again to be divided” and “united Jerusalem is Israel‟s capital”, 
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thus rejected Palestinians‟ capital hope on East Jerusalem.261 And the day was the 
42
nd
 anniversary of Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem. While Israel still dreamed 
of retaining limited settlement construction in the West Bank
262
, the Obama 
administration was clearly irritated by Netanyahu‟s comment and thus started to 
consider restraining the Netanyahu cabinet.   
Obama first comforted Abbas by reiterating his stance against any kind of 
Israeli settlement expansion.
263
 Then he and his administration analysed possible 
restraining measures to Israel. Yet most of the discussed measures were symbolic and 
thus had no significant restraining pressure on Israel. They included reducing 
diplomatic support to Israel in the United Nations and hardening criticisms on Israeli 
settlements. Yet the Obama administration had never considered strong measures of 
placing conditions against Israel settlement expectations on loan guarantees as the 
Bush I administration did in Phase I. Obama would rather carefully pick a moderate 
word “unhelpful” to describe Israeli settlement constructions in public statements.264   
Under growing pressure from the Obama administration, Netanyahu 
reluctantly accepted the principle of a future Palestinian state. Yet he made a range of 
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harsh reservations of two principles. The first one was Palestinian recognition of 
Israel as a Jewish state. The second one was demilitarization of the Palestinian 
territory, i.e. “without an army, without control of its airspace, and with effective 
security measures to prevent weapons smuggling into the territory” and without 
ability to forge military pacts. He declared, “If we receive this guarantee regarding 
demilitarization and Israel‟s security needs, and if the Palestinians recognize Israel as 
the state of the Jewish people, then we will be ready in a future peace agreement to 
reach a solution where a demilitarized Palestinian state exists alongside the Jewish 
state.”265 The Palestinian side were not satisfied with Netanyahu‟s offer, especially 
on the issue of East Jerusalem and Netanyahu‟s principle of recognition. Abbas 
suggested preconditions of Israeli stop on all settlement activities and Israeli 
acceptance of the 1967 borders as “terms of reference”. Yet Netanyahu rejected this 
counter-offer.
266
 The resulted deadlock proved that Netanyahu‟s offer could not 
convince others for a real breakthrough. Even the hawks in Israel did not show any 
worry on this suggestion, which involved the unfavourable possibility of the 
establishment of a Palestinian state.
267
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6.2.7  Controversies on East Jerusalem settlement activities 
Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak approved a range of settlement 
construction in the West Bank on September 6, 2009. This act was believed to be the 
foundation for future suspension of settlement construction in the West Bank.
268
 
Eventually Netanyahu won cabinet approval and declared a 10-month moratorium on 
settlement construction in the West Bank on November 25. He described this offer 
“far-reaching and painful”. Yet he would retain constructions of public buildings 
“essential for normal life” in the settlements and all settlement activities in East 
Jerusalem.
269
 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton first expressed appreciation of 
Netanyahu‟s offer but quickly changed her words to criticisms to Netanyahu‟s 
insufficient concessions under Arab discontent and pressure.
270
 Israel then 
announced a new round of settlement construction plan in East Jerusalem in late 
December 2009.
271
 Since then East Jerusalem settlements caused the key disputes 
between the US and Israel.  
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The US continued its efforts to facilitate the peace process despite the 
stumbling block of Israeli plan of settlement construction in East Jerusalem. The 
Obama administration finally persuaded the PA to accept “proximity talks” with 
Israel after shuttle diplomacy by George Mitchell, US Middle East Envoy, in early 
March 2009.
272
 This made US Vice President Joe Biden‟s visit to Israel a bit more 
promising. However, Israel‟s Interior Ministry gave a surprise to the visiting Biden 
on March 9, 2010, who had just publicly reiterated US security commitment to Israel 
hours earlier, by suddenly announcing new settlement construction plan of 1600 new 
housings units in Ramat Shlomo. As the stance of Obama administration was clearly 
opposing any unilateral Israeli settlement construction in East Jerusalem, Biden was 
clearly irritated by the unexpected Israeli move and condemned it as “precisely the 
kind of step that undermines the trust we need right now”.273 Yet Biden still 
appreciated responses from Netanyahu, who explained the plan would actually take 
several years but not be implemented immediately, and reiterated the “friendship” 
between the US and Israel.
274
 Despite the surprising embarrassment, Biden‟s words 
showed that the discontent of the Obama administration was limited to the 
Netanyahu cabinet at most, but not its relationship with Israel.  
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The key concern was the Israeli pursuit of settlement construction in East 
Jerusalem, but not the mere embarrassment by the Netanyahu‟s cabinet. For instance, 
Clinton warned Netanyahu that Israeli settlement construction plan in East Jerusalem 
as sending a “deeply negative signal” to “the bilateral relationship” between the US 
and Israel in a phone call subsequent to the spoiled visit of Biden. She even told him 
that the US wanted Israel to take “specific actions” to show commitment to both the 
bilateral relationship and the peace process.
275
 David Axelord, Obama‟s senior 
advisor, even argued that Israeli announcement on East Jerusalem settlement plan 
was not an accident and ill-timed but “seemed calculated” to bring adverse impact to 
the upcoming “proximity talks”.276 The reaction of the Obama administration was 
accurate as Netanyahu‟s apology was not for the settlement plan in East Jerusalem. 
What Netanyahu claimed “regrettable” and “hurtful” was for the poor timing of plan 
announcement, and he had no intention to take back the plan.
277
  
Michael B. Oren, the Israeli ambassador to the US, was even quoted for 
claiming "Israel's ties with the US are in the most serious crisis since 1975". The 
1975 disputes originated from the US demand for Israeli partial military withdrawal 
                                                 
275
 Mark Landler, “Housing plan harms ties, Clinton tells Netanyahu”, New York Times, Mar 13, 2010.  
276
 Isabel Kershner, “Netanyahu offers apology, but no shift in policy”, New York Times, Mar 14, 
2010.  
277
 Isabel Kershner, “Netanyahu offers apology, but no shift in policy”, New York Times, Mar 14, 
2010.  
151 
 
from Sinai Peninsula occupied during the Six-day War. He also argued that “no (US) 
government in the past 40 years has limited (Israeli) construction in neighbourhoods 
of Jerusalem”. 278  Although Oren later claimed that he had been “flagrantly 
misquoted”279, it was true that the US-Israeli alliance faced serious tensions in this 
case. The Obama administration perceived any settlement expansion in East 
Jerusalem would force Abbas out from the chance of peace negotiations. There was 
no barrier of the anti-terrorist interest on inviting Abbas to peace negotiations and 
thus the role of the interest of regional stability could be maximized. Therefore, the 
US had an intense interest to block Israeli plan to build extra settlement in East 
Jerusalem. However, the Netanyahu cabinet strongly maintained that East Jerusalem 
was part of the Israeli indivisible capital and was unwilling to make concessions on 
the final status of Jerusalem. Therefore the two states had a relatively strong 
divergence in the bargaining issue of East Jerusalem settlement. As a result, the 
US-Israeli relationship was under serious tensions. However, it was not an issue 
which could break the US-Israeli alliance.  
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6.2.8  Gaza Flotilla raid  
The Obama administration declared the revival of peace process through 
proximity talks in early May 2010, despite low public expectations of early 
breakthrough. The East Jerusalem settlement issues delayed the proposed peace talks 
for two months. Israel was forced to agree to preliminary discussion of core issues, 
such as the final status of Jerusalem and right of Palestinian refugee return, in the 
proximity talks.
280
 However, the peace process was soon distracted by the case 
Flotilla incident.  
On May 31, 2010, Israel navy intercepted a six-ship flotilla at international 
waters which was going to transport humanitarian aid to the Hamas-controlled yet 
Israel-blocked Gaza Strip. Passengers on the MV Mavi Marmara, one of the six ships, 
resisted and fought with Israeli naval commandos. Eventually nine passengers, eight 
Turks and one Turkish-American, were killed. This quickly caused an international 
dispute between Israel and its rare regional ally Turkey.
281
 As Turkey was also a US 
ally, despite weaker linkages compared to the US-Israeli one, this added further 
difficulties for the Obama administration to mediate the Israeli-Turkish conflicts.  
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The Obama administration persuaded Turkey to adopt condemnation on 
“acts” causing deaths rather than on Israel in UNSC statements. It also blocked the 
call for an international investigation, which let the Israelis self-investigated the 
incident. Besides, it condemned any attempt to break the Gaza blockade and 
supported Israel of its right to check whether weapons would be smuggled in Gaza 
with humanitarian aids.
282
 The reaction of the Obama administration just followed 
the trend in Phase III. As Gaza was under controlled by Hamas, a US-designated 
terrorist group, its blockade was covered by the US interests of anti-terrorism. It 
reflected the contrast in US attitude towards East Jerusalem issue which excluded 
Hamas in negotiations. As a result, the booming US-Israeli tensions were soon 
slackened by the Flotilla incident.  
Abbas decided to resume talks with the Israelis in spite of the Flotilla Incident. 
The Obama administration eventually facilitated two direct talks between Abbas and 
Netanyahu in Washington, DC and Egypt. In early September 2010, the Obama 
administration asked the Netanyahu cabinet to extend the moratorium on West Bank 
settlement construction for the sake of maintaining the peace process.
283
 Abbas 
decided to quit the peace talks in early October after Netanyahu‟s rejection of 
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moratorium extension.
284
 When Obama faced a mid-term election defeat in 
November, he lacked the momentum to push forward further progress.
285
 
Furthermore, the protests in North Africa eventually developed to an Egyptian 
revolution. Viewing the top status of Egypt in Middle East politics, the Obama 
administration would be distracted away from the Israeli-Palestinian peace process 
and the fall of Egyptian Hosni Mubarak could conclude a fourth major crises to US 
Middle East policies since the end of the Cold War. This would mean an end to Phase 
III.  
6.2.9  Distractions in Phase III 
There were similarities in the trends between Phase I and Phase III. Yet the 
restraining phenomenon in Phase III was less effective than that in Phase I. For 
instance, the Obama administration did not analyze the possibility of referencing the 
restraining trump of the Bush I administration, i.e. preconditioning the loan 
guarantees. The key reason should be the interest balancing dilemma between 
anti-terrorism and regional stability. However, the Obama administration might also 
be distracted or constrained by major domestic events, similar to Clinton‟s case of 
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sexual scandal. This limited the political energy of the Obama administration to exert 
significant pressure on Israel.  
First, the financial tsunami in 2008 heavily destroyed US economy. As 
Obama took office in the aftermath of the economic crisis, this inevitably forced 
Obama to put more focus on reviving domestic economy. Although this did not bring 
significant burden on Obama‟s diplomatic team, Israel would be more difficult to be 
restrained when US President did not pay enough efforts. Second, the Obama 
administration put the legislation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA) as one of its political priority, other than dealing with the economy in 
downturn. This further reduced Obama‟s attention to international affairs, including 
Israel. Third, perhaps most importantly, Obama faced a strong domestic antagonism 
from Republicans and Tea Party. While Bush I won a broad-based support in 
restraining Israel, Obama had to consider the reaction of his fierce political rivals. 
This ultimately constrained the policy choices of the Obama administration when his 
political rivals showed a close relationship with the governing hardliners in Israel. 
After all, there was nearly no possibility of passing a bill on preconditioning Israeli 
loan guarantees in the Congress. Yet it was difficult to examine the significance of 
the above distracting or constraining factors to the Obama administration.  
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6.3  Summary on Phase III 
The US turmoil in Iraq altered domestic preferences and eventually triggered 
US redefinition of regional interests in the Middle East. The interest of regional 
stability retrieved top priority despite continued existence of the interest of 
anti-terrorism. Yet the coexistence of the two interests meant the mutual constraining 
of them. This situation was commonly expressed as the US eagerness to revive the 
peace process in less pro-Israel terms with the US support to blockade of 
Hamas-controlled Gaza. The increased conflicts of interests made the US-Israeli 
alliance more tension-prone.   
In Phase III, the US-Israeli alliance relationship experienced a general 
downturn compared to Phase II. Yet it should be better than that in Phase I owing to 
the convergence of the anti-terrorist interest. Similar to the case in Phase I, if Israel‟s 
prime minister and the majority of his cabinet members were hardliners on issues in 
which the US and Israel had conflicts of interests, tensions between the US and Israel 
seemed inevitable. The case of East Jerusalem settlement was a best example. 
However, when the issues involved also the concerns on anti-terrorism, the US 
would not hesitate to offer its assistance to Israel even there were disputes at the time. 
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This could be shown in the US help to Israel in the case of Flotilla Incident. 
Therefore the US-Israeli alliance was still stable despite occurrence of tensions. 
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Chapter 7  Generalization and Conclusions 
7.1  Generalization on phased analysis on US-Israeli alliance relations 
After analyzing its alliance management amongst the three phases along the 
post-Cold War period, the US-Israeli alliance is found to have general fluctuations. In 
the case of the US-Israeli alliance, the US interest of regional stability, which 
triggered the US pursuit of promoting Israeli-Palestinian peace process, often 
contradicted Israeli national interests. After all, Israeli concessions to the Palestinians 
often undermine its top national interests. For instance, prohibiting settlement 
constructions in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem is a counteraction to 
Israeli top interest in territorial maximization. In Phase I, there was a general 
downturn in the US-Israeli alliance relationship because regional stability became a 
top US interest in the Middle East after the constraining anti-communist interest 
faded out. Yet the relationship retrieved an upturn during Phase II when the US 
interest of regional stability turned secondary again as constrained by a new common 
interest of anti-terrorism. In Phase III, the US and Israel experienced a downturn 
again but the level of relationship did not deteriorate to that during Phase I in general. 
Regional stability retrieved top priority but anti-terrorism remained top US interests. 
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The two contradictory interests antagonized with each other and thus limited the 
tension level in the US-Israeli alliance.  
7.1.1  Conflicting interests and tensions 
Alliance is primarily a product of the converging interests amongst various 
states. Yet diverging interests will still exist within a close and strong alliance. 
Diverging interests do not necessarily result in conflicting interests. Only conflicting 
interests (amongst the diverging interests) can cause tensions. The impact of 
conflicting interests should be one of the determinants of alliance endurance. In other 
words, both the manipulation of converging interests and the management on 
conflicting interests could offer explanation to alliance maintenance. An alliance 
relationship will become more tension-prone when allying partners experience 
growing conflicting interests or undermining common interests. The relationship of 
top interests amongst allying partners is even more crucial as a secondary interest can 
be sacrificed for the fulfilment of a top interest. Tension-proneness of an alliance is 
inversely related to the cohesiveness of the alliance. In other words, a general 
downturn in the US-Israeli relationship means the alliance becomes more 
tension-prone, vice versa.  
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However, an alliance is not destined to fall into tensions when the allying 
partners have conflicting interests. There are two possible occasions. First, if either 
(or some, or all) of the allying partners is willing to concede in advance or 
voluntarily, no disputes will be sparked and thus no tensions will grow. For instance, 
as discussed in Chapter 5, Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon initiated a plan of “unilateral 
disengagement” in Phase II. Although there may be other strategic calculations in his 
decision, such proposal did fulfil the expectation of the Bush administration to 
achieve a breakthrough in the peace process. Although regional stability was only a 
secondary interest to the US at that time, the Bush administration still hope to seek a 
breakthrough in Israeli-Palestinian peace process provided that there were no 
contradictions with US top interests. Therefore, the Bush administration expressed 
extraordinary appreciations to Sharon for his voluntary contribution to the peace 
process, even though it might be already known the secret calculations behind. 
Sharon‟s proposal not only avoided the disclosure of possible conflicting interests but 
also contrastingly strengthened the mutual trust with the Bush administration.   
Second, if there are distractions to either (or some, or all) of the allying 
partners from dealing with issues of conflicting interests. Issues around the US-Israel 
alliance were often important enough to the US and seldom allowed the US to be 
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distracted to other issues. Major domestic issues such as serious scandals of an 
administration, the approaching of presidential (or mid-term) elections, domestic 
economic crisis or political struggles may distract a US administration to focus on 
coping with the imperative troubles first. The Lewinsky affair during the Clinton era 
(Phase I), the financial tsunami occurred in late Bush II era (Phase III) and the 
bipartisan antagonism in the Obama administration (Phase III) had distracted the US 
administrations in office to different extents. The first one avoided potential disputes 
on the peace process between Clinton and Netanyahu, and the latter two between 
Obama and Netanyahu. Major international issues such as major military operations 
with US involvement will also distract a US administration from the peace process 
facilitation. The Kosovo War in 1999 (Phase I) distracted the Clinton administration 
from making substantial restraints to the Netanyahu cabinet which often prohibited 
the progress of Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. The two Iraq Wars (Phase I, II) 
had also temporarily distracted the Bush I and Bush II administrations from the peace 
process. For the first war, although the Bush I administration had restrained Israel 
from military retaliation, it did temporarily reduce attentions on the peace process 
and Israeli settlement, which Bush I and Shamir had serious disputes before the war. 
This greatly softened the US-Israeli tensions at the early stage of Phase I.  
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7.1.2  Alliance management and the maintenance of the US-Israeli alliance 
The long-term maintenance of the US-Israeli alliance raised controversies on 
the reasons behind. This thesis showed that alliance management between the US 
and Israel contributed to such maintenance. In such an asymmetric bilateral alliance, 
the US indeed often has stronger relative bargaining power over Israel. Yet if Israeli 
policy did not challenge US major regional interests in the Middle East, the US 
might not mobilize its power resources to restrain Israel. For instance, the Israeli 
military actions towards Hezbollah (Phase II) even received generous support from 
the Bush II administration. In other words, Israel was mistakenly believed to be 
free-riding with the US support because the US often passively responded to Israeli 
actions and only demanded concessions of Israel when needed. For example, the 
Obama administration was even irritated by Israeli sudden announcement of 
settlement construction in East Jerusalem during Vice President Joe Biden‟s visit to 
Israel. The Obama administration could therefore only passively respond to Israeli 
decision.  
Successful efforts of alliance management stabilize the US-Israeli relations 
when there are high conflicting interests between the two states. Examples included 
unilateral concession of either states (mostly Israel, and usually in the way of 
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successful US restraints to Israel) or mutual compromise between both states. As 
Snyder stated, alliance management serves to “counter these centrifugal tendencies, 
by either joint or unilateral action” so as to “maximize joint benefits and minimize 
costs to one‟s independent interests”.286 Israeli voluntary concessions are “unilateral 
actions”. Mutual Compromise belongs to “joint action”. US restraints to Israel were 
between “unilateral actions” and “joint actions”. Successful ones, which Israel 
reluctantly concedes, are “joint actions” while unsuccessful ones are futile “unilateral 
actions”.  
In Phase I, there were some cases of US successful restraints on Israel such as 
forcing Shamir to the Madrid conference (Bush I) and Netanyahu to the Wye River 
Summit (Clinton), and preventing Israeli retaliation to Saddam Hussein‟s 
provocation (Bush I). The attitude of the Israeli side is also decisive to the US-Israeli 
tensions. When Israel was governed by hardliners like Shamir and Netanyahu, 
disputes were easier to be sparked out as they were unwilling to make concessions to 
the US expectations. Tensions would grow when those disputes could not be settled. 
This explained why Israel could maintain a friendly relationship with the US when 
Rabin and Barak were Prime Ministers. Their relatively moderate stance towards the 
peace process meant the willingness to concede to a certain extent. Even their 
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concession might not be sufficient to achieve a final settlement of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, Israeli commitment to the US is more important in the 
long run. After all, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process was a long-term conflict (in 
the sense of conflicting expectations for the peace process between the US and 
Israel), therefore allies tended to manipulate apparent commitment rather than 
dealing with short term interests according to Snyder
287
. Yet the US at least expected 
some breakthrough in the peace process, as a kind of short-term outcomes, like the 
Oslo accords and the Wye Agreement. Camp David II was also expected to make a 
breakthrough and Clinton did not blame Barak but ascribed the responsibility to 
Arafat. Therefore it did not bring disputes between the US and Israel. According to 
Snyder, allies tended to maximize interest satisfaction in short-term conflicts.
288
 This 
could explain why US regional interests and Israeli national interests matter in the 
case of Israeli-Palestinian peace process.  
However, if alliance management attempts are not successful, the disputes 
will continue to exist and tensions will grow. In Phase III, the Obama administration 
failed to restrain the Netanyahu cabinet on East Jerusalem settlement construction 
under domestic constraints and shared interests in anti-terrorism. Therefore it was 
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difficult to resolve the tension between the Obama administration and the Netanyahu 
cabinet. Besides, successful management attempts can consolidate the alliance when 
the level of conflicting interests is low. In Phase II, Israel successfully made use of 
the common interest of anti-terrorism with the US to consolidate the alliance 
relationship. The demonization of Arafat on his responsibility for conniving violence 
in the Second Intifada, and the firm opposition stance against Hamas and Hezbollah 
showed Israeli determination to follow the US global strategy of the War on Terror. It 
had also voluntarily proposed a “unilateral disengagement” plan which has pleased 
the Bush II administration. As a consequence the US-Israeli alliance was successfully 
consolidated in Phase II.  
7.1.3  Summary 
Despite fluctuations in different phases in the post-Cold War era, the 
US-Israeli alliance still maintained close and stable relationship. The key reason was 
the series of successful alliance management between the US and Israel which 
restricted the level of tensions. The US had enough power resources to convert into 
capabilities if it noticed the urgency to restrain unfavourable Israeli actions. The 
Israel would also like to make strategic concessions to US demand when needed. The 
US and Israel would also communicate with each other to make compromise. In 
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some occasions, the potential US-Israeli disputes were avoided as the US 
administration was coincidently distracted by other domestic or international issues. 
The US-Israeli tensions have never developed to a level which would undermine the 
basis of the bilateral alliance. Furthermore, there was no decrease in the bilateral 
cooperation succeeded from the Cold War era. Cooperation has even increased since 
Phase II owing to the common top interest of anti-terrorism. As a result, the 
US-Israeli alliance can be preserved after the end of the Cold War.  
According to the analysis in Chapter 3, the survival and security of Israel had 
never been removed from the top US interests. None of the critical junctures to the 
US were directly related to Israel. Therefore the US was not triggered to re-evaluate 
its top interest to uphold the existence of Israel. A persisting alliance like the 
US-Israeli one would enjoy, in a sense, “inertia” to preserve the current status if there 
were no counterforce against it. This follows the rationale of what Halabi argued in 
his view on the redefining impact of major crises to Middle East policy and interests 
of the US. Without a critical juncture, the US administration would not re-evaluate its 
regional interests. However the maintenance of the US-Israeli alliance did not rely on 
such “inertia” as there were conflicting interests which acted as the counterforce. 
Appropriate alliance management to conflicting interests would cancel out such 
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counterforce and were beneficial to the alliance maintenance. New converging 
interests, like anti-terrorism since 9/11, would add further momentum to the alliance 
cohesion and thus add difficulties for conflicting interests to counteract. Therefore 
alliance management was still crucial to the maintenance of the US-Israeli alliance. 
The US-Israeli alliance played an important role in protecting Israel. Therefore the 
US would not consider termination of the alliance relationship with Israel unless its 
top interest to ensure Israeli existence and security was undermined. How the US and 
Israel adapt to the interests of each other belongs to the field of alliance management.  
7.2  Research contributions, limitations and recommendations 
This research showed the applicability and advantage of alliance management 
theory on the study of the US-Israeli relations. First, despite without formal security 
treaties, the US and Israel has formed a de facto alliance and thus theories on alliance 
relationship are applicable to the US-Israeli one. Second, the rare approach of 
alliance management can offer a more thorough analysis on the US-Israeli relations. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the traditional three approaches: national or strategic 
interest approach, domestic politics approach (represented by the controversial 
arguments on the Jewish lobbies), and cultural and religious affinity approach, often 
limit their arguments to the insights from their own approach. However, the 
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perspective of alliance management opens to all three traditional approaches. One 
approach may play a more important role in one case but another approach may 
better fit in another case. For instance, the Bush I administration dared to restrain 
Shamir by preconditioning the loan guarantees to Israel. Yet the Obama 
administration would never consider this option to restrain Netanyahu. The strategic 
considerations were similar in both cases. Yet Bush I enjoyed public and even 
congressional support in this decision but Obama encountered a hostile Congress and 
hardliners in the public. Thus the constraints of domestic politics could better explain 
the different decisions of the two US administrations.  
Although arguments in this research took reference from mostly the national 
or strategic interest approach and some domestic politics approach, the lobbyist 
branch of the domestic politics approach and cultural affinity approach could still 
have their insignificance. Owing to the insufficiency of sources and the subtleness of 
the influence of the linkage between lobbyist groups or cultural affinities and US 
policy towards Israel, this research would focus more on the strategic considerations 
between administrations of the US and Israel. This research could be improved by 
doing field studies in both the US and Israel and face-to-face interviews with relevant 
people in order to have in-depth investigation on (i) national or strategic interests of 
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both states, (ii) the influence of the Jewish lobbies in the US, or (iii) the influence of 
their cultural and religious affinities to foreign policy. It would be best if the research 
approach through alliance management could expand to comparing the general 
significance of three traditional approaches through their impact on US-Israeli 
alliance management. Despite certain deficiencies and limitations in research, this 
thesis still managed to offer an innovative approach to study the US-Israel relations 
through the perspective of alliance management. This perspective shows both the 
fluctuation of tension-proneness in the US-Israeli alliance and how successful 
alliance management has contributed to the post-Cold War persistence of the 
US-Israeli de facto alliance.  
Despite limitations in this research, an examination of the US-Israeli alliance 
showed that the interactions within the bilateral relationship followed the patterns of 
normal alliances. The US-Israeli alliance maintained owing to successful 
management. This could avoid overlooking factors of domestic politics and cultural 
affinities. It did not reject the potential influence of domestic lobby groups but would 
also not underestimate the strategic value of the alliance. Unlike some critics 
claiming Israel to become a strategic liability to the US, the adopted research 
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framework has showed the potential values of Israel to the US even after the end of 
the Cold War.  
7.3  Epilogue 
The real challenge of the Middle East uprising to the US was the collapse of 
Mubarak regime in Egypt. Egypt was a long-term important ally of the US and Israel. 
Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the US and Israel sought to collaborate 
with a moderate Egypt to promote regional stability and later anti-terrorism. The US 
lured Egypt with tremendous financial assistance.
289
 Hosni Mubarak served as a firm 
ally with the US and Israel since 1981. His unexpected fall from power would thus 
force both the US and Israel to reconsider its Middle East strategy. To Israel, the 
nature of top national security interests might not change but the ways to implement 
them might face the need of reformation. However it was still a question mark for the 
impact of this new major surprise to US Middle East strategy. The US might have to 
wait for the situation in Egypt to be settled down before it confirmed its new strategy. 
Besides, the US government would be probably waiting for forthcoming collapse of 
Gaddafi regime in Libya also before evaluating the ultimate impact of the series of 
Middle East uprisings. It was still unpredictable at this moment whether the new 
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Egyptian regime would maintain a close relationship with Israel. On May 2011, a 
new US-Israeli quarrel broke out owing to Obama‟s controversial usage of “1967 
border” (i.e. Israeli border before the 1967 Arab-Israeli War) as the basis of resolving 
Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. Yet Obama later supplemented that his proposal 
including land-swap up to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and eventually softened the 
tension.
290
 It could be a hint of a new general deterioration of US-Israeli relationship 
but it could also be a part of the adaptation process to the new situation. Therefore 
the exact future development was still unknown.  
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